Daily Papers

In most real-world applications of artificial intelligence, the distributions of the data and the goals of the learners tend to change over time. The Probably Approximately Correct (PAC) learning framework, which underpins most machine learning algorithms, fails to account for dynamic data distributions and evolving objectives, often resulting in suboptimal performance. Prospective learning is a recently introduced mathematical framework that overcomes some of these limitations. We build on this framework to present preliminary results that improve the algorithm and numerical results, and extend prospective learning to sequential decision-making scenarios, specifically foraging. Code is available at: https://github.com/neurodata/prolearn2.

Uncertainty learning and quantification of models are crucial tasks to enhance the trustworthiness of the models. Importantly, the recent surge of generative language models (GLMs) emphasizes the need for reliable uncertainty quantification due to the concerns on generating hallucinated facts. In this paper, we propose to learn neural prediction set models that comes with the probably approximately correct (PAC) guarantee for quantifying the uncertainty of GLMs. Unlike existing prediction set models, which are parameterized by a scalar value, we propose to parameterize prediction sets via neural networks, which achieves more precise uncertainty quantification but still satisfies the PAC guarantee. We demonstrate the efficacy of our method on four types of language datasets and six types of models by showing that our method improves the quantified uncertainty by 63% on average, compared to a standard baseline method.

As generative models become ubiquitous, there is a critical need for fine-grained control over the generation process. Yet, while controlled generation methods from prompting to fine-tuning proliferate, a fundamental question remains unanswered: are these models truly controllable in the first place? In this work, we provide a theoretical framework to formally answer this question. Framing human-model interaction as a control process, we propose a novel algorithm to estimate the controllable sets of models in a dialogue setting. Notably, we provide formal guarantees on the estimation error as a function of sample complexity: we derive probably-approximately correct bounds for controllable set estimates that are distribution-free, employ no assumptions except for output boundedness, and work for any black-box nonlinear control system (i.e., any generative model). We empirically demonstrate the theoretical framework on different tasks in controlling dialogue processes, for both language models and text-to-image generation. Our results show that model controllability is surprisingly fragile and highly dependent on the experimental setting. This highlights the need for rigorous controllability analysis, shifting the focus from simply attempting control to first understanding its fundamental limits.

Robust pedestrian trajectory forecasting is crucial to developing safe autonomous vehicles. Although previous works have studied adversarial robustness in the context of trajectory forecasting, some significant issues remain unaddressed. In this work, we try to tackle these crucial problems. Firstly, the previous definitions of robustness in trajectory prediction are ambiguous. We thus provide formal definitions for two kinds of robustness, namely label robustness and pure robustness. Secondly, as previous works fail to consider robustness about all points in a disturbance interval, we utilise a probably approximately correct (PAC) framework for robustness verification. Additionally, this framework can not only identify potential counterexamples, but also provides interpretable analyses of the original methods. Our approach is applied using a prototype tool named TrajPAC. With TrajPAC, we evaluate the robustness of four state-of-the-art trajectory prediction models -- Trajectron++, MemoNet, AgentFormer, and MID -- on trajectories from five scenes of the ETH/UCY dataset and scenes of the Stanford Drone Dataset. Using our framework, we also experimentally study various factors that could influence robustness performance.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

It is almost always easier to find an accurate-but-complex model than an accurate-yet-simple model. Finding optimal, sparse, accurate models of various forms (linear models with integer coefficients, decision sets, rule lists, decision trees) is generally NP-hard. We often do not know whether the search for a simpler model will be worthwhile, and thus we do not go to the trouble of searching for one. In this work, we ask an important practical question: can accurate-yet-simple models be proven to exist, or shown likely to exist, before explicitly searching for them? We hypothesize that there is an important reason that simple-yet-accurate models often do exist. This hypothesis is that the size of the Rashomon set is often large, where the Rashomon set is the set of almost-equally-accurate models from a function class. If the Rashomon set is large, it contains numerous accurate models, and perhaps at least one of them is the simple model we desire. In this work, we formally present the Rashomon ratio as a new gauge of simplicity for a learning problem, depending on a function class and a data set. The Rashomon ratio is the ratio of the volume of the set of accurate models to the volume of the hypothesis space, and it is different from standard complexity measures from statistical learning theory. Insight from studying the Rashomon ratio provides an easy way to check whether a simpler model might exist for a problem before finding it, namely whether several different machine learning methods achieve similar performance on the data. In that sense, the Rashomon ratio is a powerful tool for understanding why and when an accurate-yet-simple model might exist. If, as we hypothesize in this work, many real-world data sets admit large Rashomon sets, the implications are vast: it means that simple or interpretable models may often be used for high-stakes decisions without losing accuracy.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

There are now several comprehensive web applications, stand-alone computer programs and computer algebra functions that, given a floating point number such as 6.518670730718491, can return concise nonfloat constants such as 3 arctan 2 + ln 9 + 1, that closely approximate the float. Examples include AskConstants, Inverse Symbolic Calculator, the Maple identify function, MESearch, OEIS, RIES, and WolframAlpha. Usefully often such a result is the exact limit as the float is computed with increasing precision. Therefore these program results are candidates for proving an exact result that you could not otherwise compute or conjecture without the program. Moreover, candidates that are not the exact limit can be provable bounds, or convey qualitative insight, or suggest series that they truncate, or provide sufficiently close efficient approximations for subsequent computation. This article describes some of these programs, how they work, and how best to use each of them. Almost everyone who uses or should use mathematical software can benefit from acquaintance with several such programs, because these programs differ in the sets of constants that they can return.

A recent paper (van Rooij et al. 2024) claims to have proved that achieving human-like intelligence using learning from data is intractable in a complexity-theoretic sense. We identify that the proof relies on an unjustified assumption about the distribution of (input, output) pairs to the system. We briefly discuss that assumption in the context of two fundamental barriers to repairing the proof: the need to precisely define ``human-like," and the need to account for the fact that a particular machine learning system will have particular inductive biases that are key to the analysis.

We present extensive empirical evidence showing that current Bayesian simulation-based inference algorithms can produce computationally unfaithful posterior approximations. Our results show that all benchmarked algorithms -- (Sequential) Neural Posterior Estimation, (Sequential) Neural Ratio Estimation, Sequential Neural Likelihood and variants of Approximate Bayesian Computation -- can yield overconfident posterior approximations, which makes them unreliable for scientific use cases and falsificationist inquiry. Failing to address this issue may reduce the range of applicability of simulation-based inference. For this reason, we argue that research efforts should be made towards theoretical and methodological developments of conservative approximate inference algorithms and present research directions towards this objective. In this regard, we show empirical evidence that ensembling posterior surrogates provides more reliable approximations and mitigates the issue.

We propose a new test to measure a text model's multitask accuracy. The test covers 57 tasks including elementary mathematics, US history, computer science, law, and more. To attain high accuracy on this test, models must possess extensive world knowledge and problem solving ability. We find that while most recent models have near random-chance accuracy, the very largest GPT-3 model improves over random chance by almost 20 percentage points on average. However, on every one of the 57 tasks, the best models still need substantial improvements before they can reach expert-level accuracy. Models also have lopsided performance and frequently do not know when they are wrong. Worse, they still have near-random accuracy on some socially important subjects such as morality and law. By comprehensively evaluating the breadth and depth of a model's academic and professional understanding, our test can be used to analyze models across many tasks and to identify important shortcomings.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

We address the problem of optimizing a Brownian motion. We consider a (random) realization W of a Brownian motion with input space in [0,1]. Given W, our goal is to return an ε-approximation of its maximum using the smallest possible number of function evaluations, the sample complexity of the algorithm. We provide an algorithm with sample complexity of order log^2(1/ε). This improves over previous results of Al-Mharmah and Calvin (1996) and Calvin et al. (2017) which provided only polynomial rates. Our algorithm is adaptive---each query depends on previous values---and is an instance of the optimism-in-the-face-of-uncertainty principle.

Accurately predicting the future would be an important milestone in the capabilities of artificial intelligence. However, research on the ability of large language models to provide probabilistic predictions about future events remains nascent. To empirically test this ability, we enrolled OpenAI's state-of-the-art large language model, GPT-4, in a three-month forecasting tournament hosted on the Metaculus platform. The tournament, running from July to October 2023, attracted 843 participants and covered diverse topics including Big Tech, U.S. politics, viral outbreaks, and the Ukraine conflict. Focusing on binary forecasts, we show that GPT-4's probabilistic forecasts are significantly less accurate than the median human-crowd forecasts. We find that GPT-4's forecasts did not significantly differ from the no-information forecasting strategy of assigning a 50% probability to every question. We explore a potential explanation, that GPT-4 might be predisposed to predict probabilities close to the midpoint of the scale, but our data do not support this hypothesis. Overall, we find that GPT-4 significantly underperforms in real-world predictive tasks compared to median human-crowd forecasts. A potential explanation for this underperformance is that in real-world forecasting tournaments, the true answers are genuinely unknown at the time of prediction; unlike in other benchmark tasks like professional exams or time series forecasting, where strong performance may at least partly be due to the answers being memorized from the training data. This makes real-world forecasting tournaments an ideal environment for testing the generalized reasoning and prediction capabilities of artificial intelligence going forward.

Recent language models have a mysterious tendency to generate false but plausible-sounding text. Such "hallucinations" are an obstacle to the usability of language-based AI systems and can harm people who rely upon their outputs. This work shows shows that there is an inherent statistical reason that pretrained language models hallucinate certain types of facts, having nothing to do with the transformer LM architecture or data quality. For "arbitrary" facts whose veracity cannot be determined from the training data, we show that hallucination is necessary for language models that satisfy a statistical calibration condition appropriate for generative language models. Specifically, if the maximum probability of any fact is bounded, we show that the probability of generating a hallucination is close to the fraction of facts that occur exactly once in the training data (a "Good-Turing" estimate), even assuming ideal training data without errors. One conclusion is that models pretrained to be sufficiently good predictors (i.e., calibrated) may require post-training to mitigate hallucinations on the type of arbitrary facts that tend to appear once in the training set. However, our analysis also suggests that there is no statistical reason that pretraining will lead to hallucination on facts that tend to appear more than once in the training data (like references to publications such as articles and books, whose hallucinations have been particularly notable and problematic) or on systematic facts (like arithmetic calculations). Therefore, different architectures and learning algorithms may mitigate these latter types of hallucinations.

One might think that, once we know something is computable, how efficiently it can be computed is a practical question with little further philosophical importance. In this essay, I offer a detailed case that one would be wrong. In particular, I argue that computational complexity theory -- the field that studies the resources (such as time, space, and randomness) needed to solve computational problems -- leads to new perspectives on the nature of mathematical knowledge, the strong AI debate, computationalism, the problem of logical omniscience, Hume's problem of induction, Goodman's grue riddle, the foundations of quantum mechanics, economic rationality, closed timelike curves, and several other topics of philosophical interest. I end by discussing aspects of complexity theory itself that could benefit from philosophical analysis.

Do large language models (LLMs) anticipate when they will answer correctly? To study this, we extract activations after a question is read but before any tokens are generated, and train linear probes to predict whether the model's forthcoming answer will be correct. Across three open-source model families ranging from 7 to 70 billion parameters, projections on this "in-advance correctness direction" trained on generic trivia questions predict success in distribution and on diverse out-of-distribution knowledge datasets, outperforming black-box baselines and verbalised predicted confidence. Predictive power saturates in intermediate layers, suggesting that self-assessment emerges mid-computation. Notably, generalisation falters on questions requiring mathematical reasoning. Moreover, for models responding "I don't know", doing so strongly correlates with the probe score, indicating that the same direction also captures confidence. By complementing previous results on truthfulness and other behaviours obtained with probes and sparse auto-encoders, our work contributes essential findings to elucidate LLM internals.

Generating accurate and calibrated confidence estimates is critical for deploying LLMs in high-stakes or user-facing applications, and remains an open challenge. Prior research has often framed confidence as a problem of eliciting a model's "self-knowledge", i.e., the ability of an LLM to judge whether its own answers are correct; this approach implicitly assumes that there is some privileged information about the answer's correctness that is accessible to the model itself. However, our experiments reveal that an LLM attempting to predict the correctness of its own outputs generally performs no better than an unrelated LLM. Moreover, we hypothesize that a key factor in building a "Correctness Model" (CM) is exposure to a target model's historical predictions. We propose multiple methods to inject this historical correctness information, creating a Generalized Correctness Model (GCM). We first show that GCMs can be trained on the correctness data from many LLMs and learn patterns for correctness prediction applicable across datasets and models. We then use CMs as a lens for studying the source of correctness prediction ability and its generalization, systematically controlling their training data and finding that answer phrasing is a strong predictor for correctness. We further explore alternative methods of injecting history without training an LLM, finding that including history as in-context examples can help improve correctness prediction, and post-hoc calibration can provide complementary reductions in calibration error. We evaluate GCMs based on Qwen3-8B across 5 model families and the MMLU and TriviaQA datasets, as well as on a downstream selective prediction task, finding that reliable LLM confidence estimation is a generalizable and model-agnostic skill learned by systematically encoding correctness history rather than a model-specific skill reliant on self-introspection.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Many people have flipped coins but few have stopped to ponder the statistical and physical intricacies of the process. We collected 350{,}757 coin flips to test the counterintuitive prediction from a physics model of human coin tossing developed by Diaconis, Holmes, and Montgomery (DHM; 2007). The model asserts that when people flip an ordinary coin, it tends to land on the same side it started -- DHM estimated the probability of a same-side outcome to be about 51\%. Our data lend strong support to this precise prediction: the coins landed on the same side more often than not, Pr(same side) = 0.508, 95\% credible interval (CI) [0.506, 0.509], BF_{same-side bias} = 2359. Furthermore, the data revealed considerable between-people variation in the degree of this same-side bias. Our data also confirmed the generic prediction that when people flip an ordinary coin -- with the initial side-up randomly determined -- it is equally likely to land heads or tails: Pr(heads) = 0.500, 95\% CI [0.498, 0.502], BF_{heads-tails bias} = 0.182. Furthermore, this lack of heads-tails bias does not appear to vary across coins. Additional analyses revealed that the within-people same-side bias decreased as more coins were flipped, an effect that is consistent with the possibility that practice makes people flip coins in a less wobbly fashion. Our data therefore provide strong evidence that when some (but not all) people flip a fair coin, it tends to land on the same side it started.

Stochastic rounding (SR) is a probabilistic method used to round numbers to floating-point and fixed-point representations. In length n summation, the worst-case error of SR grows as n with high probability, unlike for standard modes, like round-to-nearest (RN), which grows as n. For this reason, the former is increasingly employed in large-scale, low-precision computations as an RN alternative. Additionally, SR alleviates stagnation, whereby relatively small summands are completely rounded off and do not contribute to the sum. We provide an update to [Croci et al., Roy. Soc. Open Sci. 9.3 (2022), pp. 1-25], a survey which discusses the development and use of SR between 1949 and 2022, citing over 100 references. Since then, there has been a surge of new research, and this update covers almost four years of further progress in applying, analysing, and implementing SR. Our main focus is limited-precision stochastic rounding, a new variant that fixes the precision of the random numbers used. We provide insights into industrial and numerical analysis activities surrounding SR, highlighting the next possible steps in making this rounding mode more widely available in hardware.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

You are a robot and you live in a Markov decision process (MDP) with a finite or an infinite number of transitions from state-action to next states. You got brains and so you plan before you act. Luckily, your roboparents equipped you with a generative model to do some Monte-Carlo planning. The world is waiting for you and you have no time to waste. You want your planning to be efficient. Sample-efficient. Indeed, you want to exploit the possible structure of the MDP by exploring only a subset of states reachable by following near-optimal policies. You want guarantees on sample complexity that depend on a measure of the quantity of near-optimal states. You want something, that is an extension of Monte-Carlo sampling (for estimating an expectation) to problems that alternate maximization (over actions) and expectation (over next states). But you do not want to StOP with exponential running time, you want something simple to implement and computationally efficient. You want it all and you want it now. You want TrailBlazer.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

We test whether Large Language Models (LLMs) can be used to simulate human participants in social-science studies. To do this, we run replications of 14 studies from the Many Labs 2 replication project with OpenAI's text-davinci-003 model, colloquially known as GPT3.5. Based on our pre-registered analyses, we find that among the eight studies we could analyse, our GPT sample replicated 37.5% of the original results and 37.5% of the Many Labs 2 results. However, we were unable to analyse the remaining six studies due to an unexpected phenomenon we call the "correct answer" effect. Different runs of GPT3.5 answered nuanced questions probing political orientation, economic preference, judgement, and moral philosophy with zero or near-zero variation in responses: with the supposedly "correct answer." In one exploratory follow-up study, we found that a "correct answer" was robust to changing the demographic details that precede the prompt. In another, we found that most but not all "correct answers" were robust to changing the order of answer choices. One of our most striking findings occurred in our replication of the Moral Foundations Theory survey results, where we found GPT3.5 identifying as a political conservative in 99.6% of the cases, and as a liberal in 99.3% of the cases in the reverse-order condition. However, both self-reported 'GPT conservatives' and 'GPT liberals' showed right-leaning moral foundations. Our results cast doubts on the validity of using LLMs as a general replacement for human participants in the social sciences. Our results also raise concerns that a hypothetical AI-led future may be subject to a diminished diversity-of-thought.

The field of machine learning has achieved striking progress in recent years, witnessing breakthrough results on language modelling, protein folding and nitpickingly fine-grained dog breed classification. Some even succeeded at playing computer games and board games, a feat both of engineering and of setting their employers' expectations. The central contribution of this work is to carefully examine whether this progress, and technology more broadly, can be expected to continue indefinitely. Through a rigorous application of statistical theory and failure to extrapolate beyond the training data, we answer firmly in the negative and provide details: technology will peak at 3:07 am (BST) on 20th July, 2032. We then explore the implications of this finding, discovering that individuals awake at this ungodly hour with access to a sufficiently powerful computer possess an opportunity for myriad forms of long-term linguistic 'lock in'. All we need is a large (>> 1W) data centre to seize this pivotal moment. By setting our analogue alarm clocks, we propose a tractable algorithm to ensure that, for the future of humanity, the British spelling of colour becomes the default spelling across more than 80% of the global word processing software market.

Large language models (LLMs) have made significant advancements in various natural language processing tasks, including question answering (QA) tasks. While incorporating new information with the retrieval of relevant passages is a promising way to improve QA with LLMs, the existing methods often require additional fine-tuning which becomes infeasible with recent LLMs. Augmenting retrieved passages via prompting has the potential to address this limitation, but this direction has been limitedly explored. To this end, we design a simple yet effective framework to enhance open-domain QA (ODQA) with LLMs, based on the summarized retrieval (SuRe). SuRe helps LLMs predict more accurate answers for a given question, which are well-supported by the summarized retrieval that could be viewed as an explicit rationale extracted from the retrieved passages. Specifically, SuRe first constructs summaries of the retrieved passages for each of the multiple answer candidates. Then, SuRe confirms the most plausible answer from the candidate set by evaluating the validity and ranking of the generated summaries. Experimental results on diverse ODQA benchmarks demonstrate the superiority of SuRe, with improvements of up to 4.6% in exact match (EM) and 4.0% in F1 score over standard prompting approaches. SuRe also can be integrated with a broad range of retrieval methods and LLMs. Finally, the generated summaries from SuRe show additional advantages to measure the importance of retrieved passages and serve as more preferred rationales by models and humans.

In 2016, Viazovska famously solved the sphere packing problem in dimension 8, using modular forms to construct a 'magic' function satisfying optimality conditions determined by Cohn and Elkies in 2003. In March 2024, Hariharan and Viazovska launched a project to formalize this solution and related mathematical facts in the Lean Theorem Prover. A significant milestone was achieved in February 2026: the result was formally verified, with the final stages of the verification done by Math, Inc.'s autoformalization model 'Gauss'. We discuss the techniques used to achieve this milestone, reflect on the unique collaboration between humans and Gauss, and discuss project objectives that remain.

We obtain almost sure bounds for the weighted sum sum_{n leq t} f(n){n}, where f(n) is a Steinhaus random multiplicative function. Specifically, we obtain the bounds predicted by exponentiating the law of the iterated logarithm, giving sharp upper and lower bounds.

In natural language processing, a recently popular line of work explores how to best report the experimental results of neural networks. One exemplar publication, titled "Show Your Work: Improved Reporting of Experimental Results," advocates for reporting the expected validation effectiveness of the best-tuned model, with respect to the computational budget. In the present work, we critically examine this paper. As far as statistical generalizability is concerned, we find unspoken pitfalls and caveats with this approach. We analytically show that their estimator is biased and uses error-prone assumptions. We find that the estimator favors negative errors and yields poor bootstrapped confidence intervals. We derive an unbiased alternative and bolster our claims with empirical evidence from statistical simulation. Our codebase is at http://github.com/castorini/meanmax.

People overthink; language models over-sample, and the extra effort can talk both into a worse answer. Reasoning systems answer a hard question by sampling it many times (test-time scaling), and the more they draw, the more often a correct answer turns up somewhere, so coverage, the fraction of problems with at least one correct try, climbs and appears to be progress. But a deployed system must return one answer, and choosing it, not knowing which try is right, is selection; selection is capped, and past a point extra samples only make the model surer of a confident mistake, even as every draw adds cost. The gap between climbing coverage and stalled selection, the identifiability gap, is the answer a model can produce but not pick. So the real question is not whether to sample but how far, and the answer is: not far. For picking an answer, the vote has already settled within a few dozen draws, the modal ceiling; for scoring a benchmark, sooner still, the correlation ceiling. Beyond that, extra draws cost compute and add nothing, and can even make the answer worse. This paper turns the cutoff into a single number, the effective number of samples, that any sampling run already reveals. The bottleneck is recognizing a right answer, not generating one.

We present Visuelle 2.0, the first dataset useful for facing diverse prediction problems that a fast-fashion company has to manage routinely. Furthermore, we demonstrate how the use of computer vision is substantial in this scenario. Visuelle 2.0 contains data for 6 seasons / 5355 clothing products of Nuna Lie, a famous Italian company with hundreds of shops located in different areas within the country. In particular, we focus on a specific prediction problem, namely short-observation new product sale forecasting (SO-fore). SO-fore assumes that the season has started and a set of new products is on the shelves of the different stores. The goal is to forecast the sales for a particular horizon, given a short, available past (few weeks), since no earlier statistics are available. To be successful, SO-fore approaches should capture this short past and exploit other modalities or exogenous data. To these aims, Visuelle 2.0 is equipped with disaggregated data at the item-shop level and multi-modal information for each clothing item, allowing computer vision approaches to come into play. The main message that we deliver is that the use of image data with deep networks boosts performances obtained when using the time series in long-term forecasting scenarios, ameliorating the WAPE and MAE by up to 5.48% and 7% respectively compared to competitive baseline methods. The dataset is available at https://humaticslab.github.io/forecasting/visuelle

Suppose Alice trains an open-weight language model and Bob uses a blackbox derivative of Alice's model to produce text. Can Alice prove that Bob is using her model, either by querying Bob's derivative model (query setting) or from the text alone (observational setting)? We formulate this question as an independence testing problem--in which the null hypothesis is that Bob's model or text is independent of Alice's randomized training run--and investigate it through the lens of palimpsestic memorization in language models: models are more likely to memorize data seen later in training, so we can test whether Bob is using Alice's model using test statistics that capture correlation between Bob's model or text and the ordering of training examples in Alice's training run. If Alice has randomly shuffled her training data, then any significant correlation amounts to exactly quantifiable statistical evidence against the null hypothesis, regardless of the composition of Alice's training data. In the query setting, we directly estimate (via prompting) the likelihood Bob's model gives to Alice's training examples and order; we correlate the likelihoods of over 40 fine-tunes of various Pythia and OLMo base models ranging from 1B to 12B parameters with the base model's training data order, achieving a p-value on the order of at most 1e-8 in all but six cases. In the observational setting, we try two approaches based on estimating 1) the likelihood of Bob's text overlapping with spans of Alice's training examples and 2) the likelihood of Bob's text with respect to different versions of Alice's model we obtain by repeating the last phase (e.g., 1%) of her training run on reshuffled data. The second approach can reliably distinguish Bob's text from as little as a few hundred tokens; the first does not involve any retraining but requires many more tokens (several hundred thousand) to achieve high power.

We study the task of agnostically learning halfspaces under the Gaussian distribution. Specifically, given labeled examples (x,y) from an unknown distribution on R^n times { pm 1}, whose marginal distribution on x is the standard Gaussian and the labels y can be arbitrary, the goal is to output a hypothesis with 0-1 loss OPT+epsilon, where OPT is the 0-1 loss of the best-fitting halfspace. We prove a near-optimal computational hardness result for this task, under the widely believed sub-exponential time hardness of the Learning with Errors (LWE) problem. Prior hardness results are either qualitatively suboptimal or apply to restricted families of algorithms. Our techniques extend to yield near-optimal lower bounds for related problems, including ReLU regression.

By analogy with conjectures for random matrices, Fyodorov-Hiary-Keating and Fyodorov-Keating proposed precise asymptotics for the maximum of the Riemann zeta function in a typical short interval on the critical line. In this paper, we settle the upper bound part of their conjecture in a strong form. More precisely, we show that the measure of those T leq t leq 2T for which $ max_{|h| leq 1} |zeta(1/2 + i t + i h)| > e^y log T {(loglog T)^{3/4}} is bounded by Cy e^{-2y} uniformly in y \geq 1. This is expected to be optimal for y= O(\log\log T). This upper bound is sharper than what is known in the context of random matrices, since it gives (uniform) decay rates in y$. In a subsequent paper we will obtain matching lower bounds.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.