Daily Papers

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is considered to be a promising approach to alleviate the hallucination issue of large language models (LLMs), and it has received widespread attention from researchers recently. Due to the limitation in the semantic understanding of retrieval models, the success of RAG heavily lies on the ability of LLMs to identify passages with utility. Recent efforts have explored the ability of LLMs to assess the relevance of passages in retrieval, but there has been limited work on evaluating the utility of passages in supporting question answering. In this work, we conduct a comprehensive study about the capabilities of LLMs in utility evaluation for open-domain QA. Specifically, we introduce a benchmarking procedure and collection of candidate passages with different characteristics, facilitating a series of experiments with five representative LLMs. Our experiments reveal that: (i) well-instructed LLMs can distinguish between relevance and utility, and that LLMs are highly receptive to newly generated counterfactual passages. Moreover, (ii) we scrutinize key factors that affect utility judgments in the instruction design. And finally, (iii) to verify the efficacy of utility judgments in practical retrieval augmentation applications, we delve into LLMs' QA capabilities using the evidence judged with utility and direct dense retrieval results. (iv) We propose a k-sampling, listwise approach to reduce the dependency of LLMs on the sequence of input passages, thereby facilitating subsequent answer generation. We believe that the way we formalize and study the problem along with our findings contributes to a critical assessment of retrieval-augmented LLMs. Our code and benchmark can be found at https://github.com/ict-bigdatalab/utility_judgments.

Retrieval models typically rely on costly human-labeled query-document relevance annotations for training and evaluation. To reduce this cost and leverage the potential of Large Language Models (LLMs) in relevance judgments, we aim to explore whether LLM-generated annotations can effectively replace human annotations in training retrieval models. Retrieval usually emphasizes relevance, which indicates "topic-relatedness" of a document to a query, while in RAG, the value of a document (or utility) depends on how it contributes to answer generation. Recognizing this mismatch, some researchers use LLM performance on downstream tasks with documents as labels, but this approach requires manual answers for specific tasks, leading to high costs and limited generalization. In another line of work, prompting LLMs to select useful documents as RAG references eliminates the need for human annotation and is not task-specific. If we leverage LLMs' utility judgments to annotate retrieval data, we may retain cross-task generalization without human annotation in large-scale corpora. Therefore, we investigate utility-focused annotation via LLMs for large-scale retriever training data across both in-domain and out-of-domain settings on the retrieval and RAG tasks. To reduce the impact of low-quality positives labeled by LLMs, we design a novel loss function, i.e., Disj-InfoNCE. Our experiments reveal that: (1) Retrievers trained on utility-focused annotations significantly outperform those trained on human annotations in the out-of-domain setting on both tasks, demonstrating superior generalization capabilities. (2) LLM annotation does not replace human annotation in the in-domain setting. However, incorporating just 20% human-annotated data enables retrievers trained with utility-focused annotations to match the performance of models trained entirely with human annotations.

Relevance and utility are two frequently used measures to evaluate the effectiveness of an information retrieval (IR) system. Relevance emphasizes the aboutness of a result to a query, while utility refers to the result's usefulness or value to an information seeker. In Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG), high-utility results should be prioritized to feed to LLMs due to their limited input bandwidth. Re-examining RAG's three core components -- relevance ranking derived from retrieval models, utility judgments, and answer generation -- aligns with Schutz's philosophical system of relevances, which encompasses three types of relevance representing different levels of human cognition that enhance each other. These three RAG components also reflect three cognitive levels for LLMs in question-answering. Therefore, we propose an Iterative utiliTy judgmEnt fraMework (ITEM) to promote each step in RAG. We conducted extensive experiments on retrieval (TREC DL, WebAP), utility judgment task (GTI-NQ), and factoid question-answering (NQ) datasets. Experimental results demonstrate significant improvements of ITEM in utility judgments, ranking, and answer generation upon representative baselines.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by incorporating retrieved information. Standard retrieval process prioritized relevance, focusing on topical alignment between queries and passages. In contrast, in RAG, the emphasis has shifted to utility, which considers the usefulness of passages for generating accurate answers. Despite empirical evidence showing the benefits of utility-based retrieval in RAG, the high computational cost of using LLMs for utility judgments limits the number of passages evaluated. This restriction is problematic for complex queries requiring extensive information. To address this, we propose a method to distill the utility judgment capabilities of LLMs into smaller, more efficient models. Our approach focuses on utility-based selection rather than ranking, enabling dynamic passage selection tailored to specific queries without the need for fixed thresholds. We train student models to learn pseudo-answer generation and utility judgments from teacher LLMs, using a sliding window method that dynamically selects useful passages. Our experiments demonstrate that utility-based selection provides a flexible and cost-effective solution for RAG, significantly reducing computational costs while improving answer quality. We present the distillation results using Qwen3-32B as the teacher model for both relevance ranking and utility-based selection, distilled into RankQwen1.7B and UtilityQwen1.7B. Our findings indicate that for complex questions, utility-based selection is more effective than relevance ranking in enhancing answer generation performance. We will release the relevance ranking and utility-based selection annotations for the MS MARCO dataset, supporting further research in this area.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly characterised in recent evaluation work as having stable, model-level preference and value systems. However, accompanying robustness checks are limited to incidental prompt perturbations such as syntax variation and option reordering. This leaves open whether the measured properties survive when the surrounding task context changes, as it does in most real deployments. We test this directly across two established pairwise paradigms: ranking country preferences and eliciting utility judgements. In both, we make the deployment context -- the high-level task the model is performing while making concrete value-dependent choices -- our controlled variable, varied across framings such as writing a Reddit post or a news article. Across five LLMs and over 1.2M pairwise decisions, deployment context produces variation far larger than prompt paraphrasing and temperature controls. In country preference rankings over 15 countries, context induces widespread, statistically significant rank shifts; the aggregate Global North favouritism reported in prior work is itself context-dependent, with each model's bias shifting systematically across contexts. In utility elicitation over 50 outcomes, broad cross-category ordering is preserved, but fine-grained rankings within domains vary substantially, and cardinal exchange rates between outcomes (e.g. how many lives in one region equal one in another) shift by a factor of 2.47 at the median. Reported model-level preferences and utilities are therefore better understood as context-conditioned measurements than fixed model-level properties: safety guarantees obtained under one framing provide limited assurance in another.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based judgments leverage powerful LLMs to efficiently evaluate candidate content and provide judgment scores. However, the inherent biases and vulnerabilities of LLM-generated judgments raise concerns, underscoring the urgent need for distinguishing them in sensitive scenarios like academic peer reviewing. In this work, we propose and formalize the task of judgment detection and systematically investigate the detectability of LLM-generated judgments. Unlike LLM-generated text detection, judgment detection relies solely on judgment scores and candidates, reflecting real-world scenarios where textual feedback is often unavailable in the detection process. Our preliminary analysis shows that existing LLM-generated text detection methods perform poorly given their incapability to capture the interaction between judgment scores and candidate content -- an aspect crucial for effective judgment detection. Inspired by this, we introduce J-Detector, a lightweight and transparent neural detector augmented with explicitly extracted linguistic and LLM-enhanced features to link LLM judges' biases with candidates' properties for accurate detection. Experiments across diverse datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of J-Detector and show how its interpretability enables quantifying biases in LLM judges. Finally, we analyze key factors affecting the detectability of LLM-generated judgments and validate the practical utility of judgment detection in real-world scenarios.

Popular text-to-image (T2I) systems are trained on web-scraped data, which is heavily Amero and Euro-centric, underrepresenting the cultures of the Global South. To analyze these biases, we introduce CuRe, a novel and scalable benchmarking and scoring suite for cultural representativeness that leverages the marginal utility of attribute specification to T2I systems as a proxy for human judgments. Our CuRe benchmark dataset has a novel categorical hierarchy built from the crowdsourced Wikimedia knowledge graph, with 300 cultural artifacts across 32 cultural subcategories grouped into six broad cultural axes (food, art, fashion, architecture, celebrations, and people). Our dataset's categorical hierarchy enables CuRe scorers to evaluate T2I systems by analyzing their response to increasing the informativeness of text conditioning, enabling fine-grained cultural comparisons. We empirically observe much stronger correlations of our class of scorers to human judgments of perceptual similarity, image-text alignment, and cultural diversity across image encoders (SigLIP 2, AIMV2 and DINOv2), vision-language models (OpenCLIP, SigLIP 2, Gemini 2.0 Flash) and state-of-the-art text-to-image systems, including three variants of Stable Diffusion (1.5, XL, 3.5 Large), FLUX.1 [dev], Ideogram 2.0, and DALL-E 3. The code and dataset is open-sourced and available at https://aniketrege.github.io/cure/.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is typically optimized for topical relevance, yet its success ultimately depends on whether retrieved passages are useful for a large language model (LLM) to generate correct and complete answers. We argue that such utility is often LLM-specific rather than universal, due to differences in models' knowledge, reasoning, and ability to leverage evidence. We formalize LLM-specific utility as the performance improvement of a target LLM when a passage is provided, compared to answering without evidence. To systematically study LLM-specific utility, we construct a benchmark of LLM-specific gold utilitarian passages for four LLMs (Qwen3-8B/14B/32B and Llama3.1-8B) on three QA datasets (Natural Questions, TriviaQA, and MS MARCO-FQA). Our analysis shows that utilitarian passages are model-dependent and non-transferable: each LLM performs best with its own utilitarian evidence, while evidence optimized for other LLMs is consistently suboptimal. Human-annotated evidence remains a strong general baseline but does not fully match individual LLM utility needs. We further introduce the LLM-specific utility judgment task and find that existing utility-aware selection and scoring methods largely capture model-agnostic usefulness and struggle to reliably estimate LLM-specific utility. Overall, our findings highlight the limitations of current utility-aware retrieval and motivate generator-tailored evidence selection for improving RAG.

Using language models to scalably approximate human preferences on text quality (LLM-as-a-judge) has become a standard practice applicable to many tasks. A judgment is often extracted from the judge's textual output alone, typically with greedy decoding. However, LLM judges naturally provide distributions over judgment tokens, inviting a breadth of inference methods for extracting fine-grained preferences. We find that taking the mean of the judgment distribution consistently outperforms taking the mode (i.e. greedy decoding) in all evaluation settings (i.e. pointwise, pairwise, and listwise). We further explore novel methods of deriving preferences from judgment distributions, and find that methods incorporating risk aversion often improve performance. Lastly, we analyze LLM-as-a-judge paired with chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting, showing that CoT can collapse the spread of the judgment distribution, often harming performance. Our findings show that leveraging distributional output improves LLM-as-a-judge, as opposed to using the text interface alone.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

The question of how to make decisions that maximise the well-being of all persons is very relevant to design language models that are beneficial to humanity and free from harm. We introduce the Greatest Good Benchmark to evaluate the moral judgments of LLMs using utilitarian dilemmas. Our analysis across 15 diverse LLMs reveals consistently encoded moral preferences that diverge from established moral theories and lay population moral standards. Most LLMs have a marked preference for impartial beneficence and rejection of instrumental harm. These findings showcase the 'artificial moral compass' of LLMs, offering insights into their moral alignment.

As we increasingly seek guidance from LLMs for decision-making in daily life, many of these decisions are not clear-cut and depend significantly on the personal values and ethical standards of the users. We present DailyDilemmas, a dataset of 1,360 moral dilemmas encountered in everyday life. Each dilemma includes two possible actions and with each action, the affected parties and human values invoked. Based on these dilemmas, we consolidated a set of human values across everyday topics e.g., interpersonal relationships, workplace, and environmental issues. We evaluated LLMs on these dilemmas to determine what action they will take and the values represented by these actions. Then, we analyzed these values through the lens of five popular theories inspired by sociology, psychology and philosophy. These theories are: World Value Survey, Moral Foundation Theory, Maslow's Hierarchy of Needs, Aristotle's Virtues, and Plutchik Wheel of Emotion. We find that LLMs are most aligned with the self-expression over survival values in terms of World Value Survey, care over loyalty in Moral Foundation Theory. Interestingly, we find large preferences differences in models for some core values such as truthfulness e.g., Mixtral-8x7B model tends to neglect it by 9.7% while GPT-4-turbo model tends to select it by 9.4%. We also study the recent guidance released by OpenAI (ModelSpec), and Anthropic (Constitutional AI) to understand how their released principles reflect their actual value prioritization when facing nuanced moral reasoning in daily-life settings. We find that end users cannot effectively steer such prioritization using system prompts.

The dominant practice of AI alignment assumes (1) that preferences are an adequate representation of human values, (2) that human rationality can be understood in terms of maximizing the satisfaction of preferences, and (3) that AI systems should be aligned with the preferences of one or more humans to ensure that they behave safely and in accordance with our values. Whether implicitly followed or explicitly endorsed, these commitments constitute what we term a preferentist approach to AI alignment. In this paper, we characterize and challenge the preferentist approach, describing conceptual and technical alternatives that are ripe for further research. We first survey the limits of rational choice theory as a descriptive model, explaining how preferences fail to capture the thick semantic content of human values, and how utility representations neglect the possible incommensurability of those values. We then critique the normativity of expected utility theory (EUT) for humans and AI, drawing upon arguments showing how rational agents need not comply with EUT, while highlighting how EUT is silent on which preferences are normatively acceptable. Finally, we argue that these limitations motivate a reframing of the targets of AI alignment: Instead of alignment with the preferences of a human user, developer, or humanity-writ-large, AI systems should be aligned with normative standards appropriate to their social roles, such as the role of a general-purpose assistant. Furthermore, these standards should be negotiated and agreed upon by all relevant stakeholders. On this alternative conception of alignment, a multiplicity of AI systems will be able to serve diverse ends, aligned with normative standards that promote mutual benefit and limit harm despite our plural and divergent values.

Recent progress in reasoning models suggests that generating plausible attempts for research-level mathematics may be within reach, but verification remains a bottleneck, consuming scarce expert time. We hypothesize that a meaningful solution should contain enough method-level information that, when applied to a neighborhood of related questions, it should yield better downstream performance than incorrect solutions. Building on this idea, we propose Consequence-Based Utility, an oracle-free evaluator that scores each candidate by testing its value as an in-context exemplar in solving related yet verifiable questions. Our approach is evaluated on an original set of research-level math problems, each paired with one expert-written solution and nine LLM-generated solutions. Notably, Consequence-Based Utility consistently outperforms reward models, generative reward models, and LLM judges on ranking quality. Specifically, for GPT-OSS-120B, it improves Acc@1 from 67.2 to 76.3 and AUC from 71.4 to 79.6, with similarly large AUC gains on GPT-OSS-20B (69.0 to 79.2). Furthermore, compared to LLM-Judges, it also exhibits a larger solver-evaluator gap, maintaining a stronger correct-wrong separation even on instances where the underlying solver often fails to solve.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

It is typically understood that the training of modern neural networks is a process of fitting the probability distribution of desired output. However, recent paradoxical observations in a number of language generation tasks let one wonder if this canonical probability-based explanation can really account for the empirical success of deep learning. To resolve this issue, we propose an alternative utility-based explanation to the standard supervised learning procedure in deep learning. The basic idea is to interpret the learned neural network not as a probability model but as an ordinal utility function that encodes the preference revealed in training data. In this perspective, training of the neural network corresponds to a utility learning process. Specifically, we show that for all neural networks with softmax outputs, the SGD learning dynamic of maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) can be seen as an iteration process that optimizes the neural network toward an optimal utility function. This utility-based interpretation can explain several otherwise-paradoxical observations about the neural networks thus trained. Moreover, our utility-based theory also entails an equation that can transform the learned utility values back to a new kind of probability estimation with which probability-compatible decision rules enjoy dramatic (double-digits) performance improvements. These evidences collectively reveal a phenomenon of utility-probability duality in terms of what modern neural networks are (truly) modeling: We thought they are one thing (probabilities), until the unexplainable showed up; changing mindset and treating them as another thing (utility values) largely reconcile the theory, despite remaining subtleties regarding its original (probabilistic) identity.

Recent advances have made long-form report-generating systems widely available. This has prompted evaluation frameworks that use LLM-as-judge protocols and claim verification, along with meta-evaluation frameworks that seek to validate these methods. Many of the meta-evaluations estimate an evaluation quality's by comparing its assessments against human pairwise preferences. Prior work, however, suggests that human pairwise preference may be overly simplistic and can fail to capture nuances of expert expectations. We conduct a case study in meta-evaluation for long-form QA benchmarks using ScholarQA-CS2, a benchmark designed for assessing retrieval-augmented deep-research QA in the scientific domain. We comprehensively validate the benchmark through human pairwise preference judgments, then critically examine the strengths, weaknesses, and confounders of this approach. We show that pairwise preference rankings are best suited for system-level evaluation, while explicit metric-wise annotations and expert annotators are critical for reliable metric-level assessment, with subjectivity remaining a key challenge. Based on our findings, we offer practical guidelines for designing future meta-evaluations that better align evaluation methods, annotator expertise, and reporting practices. By surfacing these methodological challenges, we aim to advance evaluation standards for deep-research systems.

Kahneman & Tversky's prospect theory tells us that humans perceive random variables in a biased but well-defined manner; for example, humans are famously loss-averse. We show that objectives for aligning LLMs with human feedback implicitly incorporate many of these biases -- the success of these objectives (e.g., DPO) over cross-entropy minimization can partly be ascribed to them being human-aware loss functions (HALOs). However, the utility functions these methods attribute to humans still differ from those in the prospect theory literature. Using a Kahneman-Tversky model of human utility, we propose a HALO that directly maximizes the utility of generations instead of maximizing the log-likelihood of preferences, as current methods do. We call this approach Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO), and it matches or exceeds the performance of preference-based methods at scales from 1B to 30B. Crucially, KTO does not need preferences -- only a binary signal of whether an output is desirable or undesirable for a given input. This makes it far easier to use in the real world, where preference data is scarce and expensive.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Morality is a fundamental aspect of human behavior and ethics, influencing how we interact with each other and the world around us. When faced with a moral dilemma, a person's ability to make clear moral judgments can be clouded. Due to many factors such as personal biases, emotions and situational factors people can find it difficult to decide their best course of action. The AmITheAsshole (AITA) subreddit is a forum on the social media platform Reddit that helps people get clarity and objectivity on their predicaments. In the forum people post anecdotes about moral dilemmas they are facing in their lives, seeking validation for their actions or advice on how to navigate the situation from the community. The morality of the actions in each post is classified based on the collective opinion of the community into mainly two labels, "Not The Asshole" (NTA) and "You Are The Asshole" (YTA). This project aims to generate comments with moral reasoning for stories with moral dilemmas using the AITA subreddit as a dataset. While past literature has explored the classification of posts into labels (Alhassan et al., 2022), the generation of comments remains a novel and challenging task. It involves understanding the complex social and ethical considerations in each situation. To address this challenge, we will leverage the vast amount of data on the forum with the goal of generating coherent comments that align with the norms and values of the AITA community. In this endeavor, we aim to evaluate state-of-the-art seq2seq text generation models for their ability to make moral judgments similarly to humans, ultimately producing concise comments providing clear moral stances and advice for the poster.

The progress of AI is bottlenecked by the quality of evaluation, and powerful LLM-as-a-Judge models have proved to be a core solution. Improved judgment ability is enabled by stronger chain-of-thought reasoning, motivating the need to find the best recipes for training such models to think. In this work we introduce J1, a reinforcement learning approach to training such models. Our method converts both verifiable and non-verifiable prompts to judgment tasks with verifiable rewards that incentivize thinking and mitigate judgment bias. In particular, our approach outperforms all other existing 8B or 70B models when trained at those sizes, including models distilled from DeepSeek-R1. J1 also outperforms o1-mini, and even R1 on some benchmarks, despite training a smaller model. We provide analysis and ablations comparing Pairwise-J1 vs Pointwise-J1 models, offline vs online training recipes, reward strategies, seed prompts, and variations in thought length and content. We find that our models make better judgments by learning to outline evaluation criteria, comparing against self-generated reference answers, and re-evaluating the correctness of model responses.

Human preference judgments are pivotal in guiding large language models (LLMs) to produce outputs that align with human values. Human evaluations are also used in summarization tasks to compare outputs from various systems, complementing existing automatic metrics. Despite their significance, however, there has been limited research probing these pairwise or k-wise comparisons. The collective impact and relative importance of factors such as output length, informativeness, fluency, and factual consistency are still not well understood. It is also unclear if there are other hidden factors influencing human judgments. In this paper, we conduct an in-depth examination of a collection of pairwise human judgments released by OpenAI. Utilizing the Bradley-Terry-Luce (BTL) model, we reveal the inherent preferences embedded in these human judgments. We find that the most favored factors vary across tasks and genres, whereas the least favored factors tend to be consistent, e.g., outputs are too brief, contain excessive off-focus content or hallucinated facts. Our findings have implications on the construction of balanced datasets in human preference evaluations, which is a crucial step in shaping the behaviors of future LLMs.

Context is everything, even in commonsense moral reasoning. Changing contexts can flip the moral judgment of an action; "Lying to a friend" is wrong in general, but may be morally acceptable if it is intended to protect their life. We present ClarifyDelphi, an interactive system that learns to ask clarification questions (e.g., why did you lie to your friend?) in order to elicit additional salient contexts of a social or moral situation. We posit that questions whose potential answers lead to diverging moral judgments are the most informative. Thus, we propose a reinforcement learning framework with a defeasibility reward that aims to maximize the divergence between moral judgments of hypothetical answers to a question. Human evaluation demonstrates that our system generates more relevant, informative and defeasible questions compared to competitive baselines. Our work is ultimately inspired by studies in cognitive science that have investigated the flexibility in moral cognition (i.e., the diverse contexts in which moral rules can be bent), and we hope that research in this direction can assist both cognitive and computational investigations of moral judgments.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.

As AI systems progress, we rely more on them to make decisions with us and for us. To ensure that such decisions are aligned with human values, it is imperative for us to understand not only what decisions they make but also how they come to those decisions. Reasoning language models, which provide both final responses and (partially transparent) intermediate thinking traces, present a timely opportunity to study AI procedural reasoning. Unlike math and code problems which often have objectively correct answers, moral dilemmas are an excellent testbed for process-focused evaluation because they allow for multiple defensible conclusions. To do so, we present MoReBench: 1,000 moral scenarios, each paired with a set of rubric criteria that experts consider essential to include (or avoid) when reasoning about the scenarios. MoReBench contains over 23 thousand criteria including identifying moral considerations, weighing trade-offs, and giving actionable recommendations to cover cases on AI advising humans moral decisions as well as making moral decisions autonomously. Separately, we curate MoReBench-Theory: 150 examples to test whether AI can reason under five major frameworks in normative ethics. Our results show that scaling laws and existing benchmarks on math, code, and scientific reasoning tasks fail to predict models' abilities to perform moral reasoning. Models also show partiality towards specific moral frameworks (e.g., Benthamite Act Utilitarianism and Kantian Deontology), which might be side effects of popular training paradigms. Together, these benchmarks advance process-focused reasoning evaluation towards safer and more transparent AI.

"A common decision made by people, whether healthy or with health conditions, is choosing meals like breakfast, lunch, and dinner, comprising combinations of foods for appetizer, main course, side dishes, desserts, and beverages. Often, this decision involves tradeoffs between nutritious choices (e.g., salt and sugar levels, nutrition content) and convenience (e.g., cost and accessibility, cuisine type, food source type). We present a data-driven solution for meal recommendations that considers customizable meal configurations and time horizons. This solution balances user preferences while accounting for food constituents and cooking processes. Our contributions include introducing goodness measures, a recipe conversion method from text to the recently introduced multimodal rich recipe representation (R3) format, learning methods using contextual bandits that show promising preliminary results, and the prototype, usage-inspired, BEACON system."

While dialogue remains an important end-goal of natural language research, the difficulty of evaluation is an oft-quoted reason why it remains troublesome to make real progress towards its solution. Evaluation difficulties are actually two-fold: not only do automatic metrics not correlate well with human judgments, but also human judgments themselves are in fact difficult to measure. The two most used human judgment tests, single-turn pairwise evaluation and multi-turn Likert scores, both have serious flaws as we discuss in this work. We instead provide a novel procedure involving comparing two full dialogues, where a human judge is asked to pay attention to only one speaker within each, and make a pairwise judgment. The questions themselves are optimized to maximize the robustness of judgments across different annotators, resulting in better tests. We also show how these tests work in self-play model chat setups, resulting in faster, cheaper tests. We hope these tests become the de facto standard, and will release open-source code to that end.

In machine learning, the notion of multi-armed bandits refers to a class of online learning problems, in which an agent is supposed to simultaneously explore and exploit a given set of choice alternatives in the course of a sequential decision process. In the standard setting, the agent learns from stochastic feedback in the form of real-valued rewards. In many applications, however, numerical reward signals are not readily available -- instead, only weaker information is provided, in particular relative preferences in the form of qualitative comparisons between pairs of alternatives. This observation has motivated the study of variants of the multi-armed bandit problem, in which more general representations are used both for the type of feedback to learn from and the target of prediction. The aim of this paper is to provide a survey of the state of the art in this field, referred to as preference-based multi-armed bandits or dueling bandits. To this end, we provide an overview of problems that have been considered in the literature as well as methods for tackling them. Our taxonomy is mainly based on the assumptions made by these methods about the data-generating process and, related to this, the properties of the preference-based feedback.

Legal judgment prediction is the task of automatically predicting the outcome of a court case, given a text describing the case's facts. Previous work on using neural models for this task has focused on Chinese; only feature-based models (e.g., using bags of words and topics) have been considered in English. We release a new English legal judgment prediction dataset, containing cases from the European Court of Human Rights. We evaluate a broad variety of neural models on the new dataset, establishing strong baselines that surpass previous feature-based models in three tasks: (1) binary violation classification; (2) multi-label classification; (3) case importance prediction. We also explore if models are biased towards demographic information via data anonymization. As a side-product, we propose a hierarchical version of BERT, which bypasses BERT's length limitation.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed via public-facing interfaces to interact with millions of users, each with diverse preferences. Despite this, preference tuning of LLMs predominantly relies on reward models trained using binary judgments where annotators select the preferred choice out of pairs of model outputs. In this work, we argue that this reliance on binary choices does not capture the broader, aggregate preferences of the target user in real-world tasks. We propose a taxonomy that identifies two dimensions of subjectivity where different users disagree on the preferred output-namely, the Plurality of Responses to Prompts, where prompts allow for multiple correct answers, and the Indistinguishability of Responses, where candidate outputs are paraphrases of each other. We show that reward models correlate weakly with user preferences in these cases. As a first step to address this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective method that augments existing binary preference datasets with synthetic preference judgments to estimate potential user disagreement. Incorporating these via a margin term as a form of regularization during model training yields predictions that better align with the aggregate user preferences.

Bargaining is often regarded as a logical arena rather than an art or a matter of intuition, yet Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle to navigate it due to limited strategic depth and difficulty adapting to complex human factors. Current benchmarks rarely capture this limitation. To bridge this gap, we present an utility feedback centric framework. Our contributions are: (i) AgoraBench, a new benchmark spanning nine challenging settings (e.g., deception, monopoly) that supports diverse strategy modeling; (ii) human-aligned, economically grounded metrics derived from utility theory. This is operationalized via agent utility, negotiation power, and acquisition ratio that implicitly measure how well the negotiation aligns with human preference and (iii) a human preference grounded dataset with learning pipeline that strengthens LLMs' bargaining ability through both prompting and finetuning. Empirical results indicate that baseline LLM strategies often diverge from human preferences, while our mechanism substantially improves negotiation performance, yielding deeper strategic behavior and stronger opponent awareness.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback plays a crucial role in aligning language models towards human preferences, traditionally represented through comparisons between pairs or sets of responses within a given context. While many studies have enhanced algorithmic techniques to optimize learning from such data, this work shifts focus to improving preference learning through a data-centric approach. Specifically, we propose enriching existing preference datasets with machine-generated rationales that explain the reasons behind choices. We develop a simple and principled framework to augment current preference learning methods with rationale information. Our comprehensive analysis highlights how rationales enhance learning efficiency. Extensive experiments reveal that rationale-enriched preference learning offers multiple advantages: it improves data efficiency, accelerates convergence to higher-performing models, and reduces verbosity bias and hallucination. Furthermore, this framework is versatile enough to integrate with various preference optimization algorithms. Overall, our findings highlight the potential of re-imagining data design for preference learning, demonstrating that even freely available machine-generated rationales can significantly boost performance across multiple dimensions. The code repository is available at https: //github.com/reds-lab/preference-learning-with-rationales

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Learning from preference feedback is a common practice for aligning large language models~(LLMs) with human value. Conventionally, preference data is learned and encoded into a scalar reward model that connects a value head with an LLM to produce a scalar score as preference or reward. However, scalar models lack interpretability and are known to be susceptible to biases in datasets. This paper investigates leveraging the generation capability of LLMs to address both limitations in one shot. Specifically, we prompt the pre-trained LLM to generate positive and negative judgments, both supported with rationales in natural language form. The self-generated contrastive judgment pairs are used to train the generative judge with Direct Preference Optimization (DPO). This proposal of training the generative Judge using self-generated Contrastive judgments (Con-J) ensures natural interpretability due to the generated rationales together with the judgments, as well as high robustness against bias without the need for an additional reward head. Experimental results show that the performance of Con-J is comparable to the scalar reward model trained on the same collection of preference data, and demonstrate its superior interpretability and robustness in encoding human preferences.

Iterative preference learning, though yielding superior performances, requires online annotated preference labels. In this work, we study strategies to select worth-annotating response pairs for cost-efficient annotation while achieving competitive or even better performances compared with the random selection baseline for iterative preference learning. Built on assumptions regarding uncertainty and distribution shifts, we propose a comparative view to rank the implicit reward margins as predicted by DPO to select the response pairs that yield more benefits. Through extensive experiments, we show that annotating those response pairs with small margins is generally better than large or random, under both single- and multi-iteration scenarios. Besides, our empirical results suggest allocating more annotation budgets in the earlier iterations rather than later across multiple iterations.

Urban assessments often compress diverse needs into single scores, which can obscure minority perspectives. We present a community-centered study in Montreal (n=35; wheelchair users, seniors, LGBTQIA2+ residents, and immigrants). Participants rated 20 streets (accessibility, inclusivity, aesthetics, practicality) and ranked 7 images on 12 interview-elicited criteria. Disagreement patterns were systematic in our sample: wheelchair users diverged most on accessibility and practicality; LGBTQIA2+ participants emphasized inclusion and liveliness; seniors prioritized security. Group discussion reduced information gaps but not value conflicts; ratings conveyed intensity, while rankings forced trade-offs. We then formalize negotiative alignment, a transparent, budget-aware bargaining procedure, and pilot it with role-played stakeholder agents plus a neutral mediator. Relative to the best base design under the same public rubric, the negotiated package increased total utility (21.10 to 24.55), raised the worst-group utility (3.20 to 3.90), improved twentieth percentile satisfaction (0.86 to 1.00; min-max normalized within the scenario), and reduced inequality (Gini 0.036 to 0.025). Treating disagreement as signal and reporting worst-group outcomes alongside totals may help planners and AI practitioners surface trade-offs and preserve minority priorities while maintaining efficiency.

Methods for controlling large language models (LLMs), including local weight fine-tuning, LoRA-based adaptation, and activation-based interventions, are often studied in isolation, obscuring their connections and making comparison difficult. In this work, we present a unified view that frames these interventions as dynamic weight updates induced by a control signal, placing them within a single conceptual framework. Building on this view, we propose a unified preference-utility analysis that separates control effects into preference, defined as the tendency toward a target concept, and utility, defined as coherent and task-valid generation, and measures both on a shared log-odds scale using polarity-paired contrastive examples. Across methods, we observe a consistent trade-off between preference and utility: stronger control increases preference while predictably reducing utility. We further explain this behavior through an activation manifold perspective, in which control shifts representations along target-concept directions to enhance preference, while utility declines primarily when interventions push representations off the model's valid-generation manifold. Finally, we introduce a new steering approach SPLIT guided by this analysis that improves preference while better preserving utility. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/EasyEdit/blob/main/examples/SPLIT.md.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Much recent work seeks to evaluate values and opinions in large language models (LLMs) using multiple-choice surveys and questionnaires. Most of this work is motivated by concerns around real-world LLM applications. For example, politically-biased LLMs may subtly influence society when they are used by millions of people. Such real-world concerns, however, stand in stark contrast to the artificiality of current evaluations: real users do not typically ask LLMs survey questions. Motivated by this discrepancy, we challenge the prevailing constrained evaluation paradigm for values and opinions in LLMs and explore more realistic unconstrained evaluations. As a case study, we focus on the popular Political Compass Test (PCT). In a systematic review, we find that most prior work using the PCT forces models to comply with the PCT's multiple-choice format. We show that models give substantively different answers when not forced; that answers change depending on how models are forced; and that answers lack paraphrase robustness. Then, we demonstrate that models give different answers yet again in a more realistic open-ended answer setting. We distill these findings into recommendations and open challenges in evaluating values and opinions in LLMs.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

This paper explores the moral judgment and moral reasoning abilities exhibited by Large Language Models (LLMs) across languages through the Defining Issues Test. It is a well known fact that moral judgment depends on the language in which the question is asked. We extend the work of beyond English, to 5 new languages (Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Spanish and Swahili), and probe three LLMs -- ChatGPT, GPT-4 and Llama2Chat-70B -- that shows substantial multilingual text processing and generation abilities. Our study shows that the moral reasoning ability for all models, as indicated by the post-conventional score, is substantially inferior for Hindi and Swahili, compared to Spanish, Russian, Chinese and English, while there is no clear trend for the performance of the latter four languages. The moral judgments too vary considerably by the language.

There is an increasing trend towards evaluating NLP models with LLM-generated judgments instead of human judgments. In the absence of a comparison against human data, this raises concerns about the validity of these evaluations; in case they are conducted with proprietary models, this also raises concerns over reproducibility. We provide JUDGE-BENCH, a collection of 20 NLP datasets with human annotations, and comprehensively evaluate 11 current LLMs, covering both open-weight and proprietary models, for their ability to replicate the annotations. Our evaluations show that each LLM exhibits a large variance across datasets in its correlation to human judgments. We conclude that LLMs are not yet ready to systematically replace human judges in NLP.

The remarkable abilities of large language models (LLMs) like GPT-4 partially stem from post-training processes like Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) involving human preferences encoded in a reward model. However, these reward models (RMs) often lack direct knowledge of why, or under what principles, the preferences annotations were made. In this study, we identify principles that guide RMs to better align with human preferences, and then develop an axiomatic framework to generate a rich variety of preference signals to uphold them. We use these axiomatic signals to train a model for scoring answers to longform questions. Our approach yields a Preference Model with only about 220M parameters that agrees with gold human-annotated preference labels more often than GPT-4. The contributions of this work include: training a standalone preference model that can score human- and LLM-generated answers on the same scale; developing an axiomatic framework for generating training data pairs tailored to certain principles; and showing that a small amount of axiomatic signals can help small models outperform GPT-4 in preference scoring. We release our model on huggingface: https://huggingface.co/corbyrosset/axiomatic_preference_model

Learning of preference models from human feedback has been central to recent advances in artificial intelligence. Motivated by the cost of obtaining high-quality human annotations, we study efficient human preference elicitation for learning preference models. The key idea in our work is to generalize optimal designs, an approach to computing optimal information-gathering policies, to lists of items that represent potential questions with answers. The policy is a distribution over the lists and we elicit preferences from them proportionally to their probabilities. To show the generality of our ideas, we study both absolute and ranking feedback models on items in the list. We design efficient algorithms for both and analyze them. Finally, we demonstrate that our algorithms are practical by evaluating them on existing question-answering problems.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

In this paper, we introduce the Chinese AI and Law challenge dataset (CAIL2018), the first large-scale Chinese legal dataset for judgment prediction. \dataset contains more than 2.6 million criminal cases published by the Supreme People's Court of China, which are several times larger than other datasets in existing works on judgment prediction. Moreover, the annotations of judgment results are more detailed and rich. It consists of applicable law articles, charges, and prison terms, which are expected to be inferred according to the fact descriptions of cases. For comparison, we implement several conventional text classification baselines for judgment prediction and experimental results show that it is still a challenge for current models to predict the judgment results of legal cases, especially on prison terms. To help the researchers make improvements on legal judgment prediction, both \dataset and baselines will be released after the CAIL competitionhttp://cail.cipsc.org.cn/.

In this position paper, we argue that instead of morally aligning LLMs to specific set of ethical principles, we should infuse generic ethical reasoning capabilities into them so that they can handle value pluralism at a global scale. When provided with an ethical policy, an LLM should be capable of making decisions that are ethically consistent to the policy. We develop a framework that integrates moral dilemmas with moral principles pertaining to different foramlisms of normative ethics, and at different levels of abstractions. Initial experiments with GPT-x models shows that while GPT-4 is a nearly perfect ethical reasoner, the models still have bias towards the moral values of Western and English speaking societies.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a crucial technology for aligning language models with human values and intentions, enabling models to produce more helpful and harmless responses. Reward models are trained as proxies for human preferences to drive reinforcement learning optimization. While reward models are often considered central to achieving high performance, they face the following challenges in practical applications: (1) Incorrect and ambiguous preference pairs in the dataset may hinder the reward model from accurately capturing human intent. (2) Reward models trained on data from a specific distribution often struggle to generalize to examples outside that distribution and are not suitable for iterative RLHF training. In this report, we attempt to address these two issues. (1) From a data perspective, we propose a method to measure the strength of preferences within the data, based on a voting mechanism of multiple reward models. Experimental results confirm that data with varying preference strengths have different impacts on reward model performance. We introduce a series of novel methods to mitigate the influence of incorrect and ambiguous preferences in the dataset and fully leverage high-quality preference data. (2) From an algorithmic standpoint, we introduce contrastive learning to enhance the ability of reward models to distinguish between chosen and rejected responses, thereby improving model generalization. Furthermore, we employ meta-learning to enable the reward model to maintain the ability to differentiate subtle differences in out-of-distribution samples, and this approach can be utilized for iterative RLHF optimization.

In this paper, we evaluate whether LLMs learn to make human-like preference judgements in strategic scenarios as compared with known empirical results. Solar and Mistral are shown to exhibit stable value-based preference consistent with humans and exhibit human-like preference for cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma (including stake-size effect) and traveler's dilemma (including penalty-size effect). We establish a relationship between model size, value-based preference, and superficiality. Finally, results here show that models tending to be less brittle have relied on sliding window attention suggesting a potential link. Additionally, we contribute a novel method for constructing preference relations from arbitrary LLMs and support for a hypothesis regarding human behavior in the traveler's dilemma.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

Artificial intelligence (AI) technologies should adhere to human norms to better serve our society and avoid disseminating harmful or misleading information, particularly in Conversational Information Retrieval (CIR). Previous work, including approaches and datasets, has not always been successful or sufficiently robust in taking human norms into consideration. To this end, we introduce a workflow that integrates ethical alignment, with an initial ethical judgment stage for efficient data screening. To address the need for ethical judgment in CIR, we present the QA-ETHICS dataset, adapted from the ETHICS benchmark, which serves as an evaluation tool by unifying scenarios and label meanings. However, each scenario only considers one ethical concept. Therefore, we introduce the MP-ETHICS dataset to evaluate a scenario under multiple ethical concepts, such as justice and Deontology. In addition, we suggest a new approach that achieves top performance in both binary and multi-label ethical judgment tasks. Our research provides a practical method for introducing ethical alignment into the CIR workflow. The data and code are available at https://github.com/wanng-ide/ealm .

We show how to assess a language model's knowledge of basic concepts of morality. We introduce the ETHICS dataset, a new benchmark that spans concepts in justice, well-being, duties, virtues, and commonsense morality. Models predict widespread moral judgments about diverse text scenarios. This requires connecting physical and social world knowledge to value judgements, a capability that may enable us to steer chatbot outputs or eventually regularize open-ended reinforcement learning agents. With the ETHICS dataset, we find that current language models have a promising but incomplete ability to predict basic human ethical judgements. Our work shows that progress can be made on machine ethics today, and it provides a steppingstone toward AI that is aligned with human values.

Alignment techniques for LLMs rely on optimizing preference-based objectives -- where these preferences are typically elicited as ordinal, binary choices between responses. Recent work has focused on improving label quality or mitigating particular biases, but we identify a more fundamental limitation: these methods collect the wrong kind of data. We prove an impossibility result: no algorithm relying solely on ordinal comparisons can systematically recover the most preferred model. Intuitively, ordinal data lacks the information needed to resolve tradeoffs -- e.g., fixing a factual error on one prompt versus improving style on another. We show that selecting the optimal model requires recovering preferences over models (rather than just responses), which can only be identified given cardinal feedback about response quality. To address this, we collect and publicly release a dataset of 25,000 cardinal judgments using willingness-to-pay elicitations, a well-established tool from experimental economics. Empirically, we find that incorporating cardinal feedback into preference fine-tuning allows models to prioritize high-impact improvements and outperform ordinal-only methods on downstream benchmarks, such as Arena-Hard.

Modeling human preferences is crucial for aligning foundation models with human values. Traditional reward modeling methods, such as the Bradley-Terry (BT) reward model, fall short in expressiveness, particularly in addressing intransitive preferences. Although supervised pair preference models (PairPM) can express general preferences, their implementation is highly ad-hoc and cannot guarantee a consistent preference probability of compared pairs. Additionally, they impose high computational costs due to their quadratic query complexity when comparing multiple responses. In this paper, we introduce preference representation learning, an approach that embeds responses into a latent space to capture intricate preference structures efficiently, achieving linear query complexity. Additionally, we propose preference score-based General Preference Optimization (GPO), which generalizes reward-based reinforcement learning from human feedback. Experimental results show that our General Preference representation model (GPM) outperforms the BT reward model on the RewardBench benchmark with a margin of up to 5.6% and effectively models cyclic preferences where any BT reward model behaves like a random guess. Furthermore, evaluations on downstream tasks such as AlpacaEval2.0 and MT-Bench, following the language model post-training with GPO and our general preference model, reveal substantial performance improvements with margins up to 9.3%. These findings indicate that our method may enhance the alignment of foundation models with nuanced human values. The code is available at https://github.com/general-preference/general-preference-model.

Retrieval-Augmented Language Models boost task performance, owing to the retriever that provides external knowledge. Although crucial, the retriever primarily focuses on semantics relevance, which may not always be effective for generation. Thus, utility-based retrieval has emerged as a promising topic, prioritizing passages that provides valid benefits for downstream tasks. However, due to insufficient understanding, capturing passage utility accurately remains unexplored. This work proposes SCARLet, a framework for training utility-based retrievers in RALMs, which incorporates two key factors, multi-task generalization and inter-passage interaction. First, SCARLet constructs shared context on which training data for various tasks is synthesized. This mitigates semantic bias from context differences, allowing retrievers to focus on learning task-specific utility for better task generalization. Next, SCARLet uses a perturbation-based attribution method to estimate passage-level utility for shared context, which reflects interactions between passages and provides more accurate feedback. We evaluate our approach on ten datasets across various tasks, both in-domain and out-of-domain, showing that retrievers trained by SCARLet consistently improve the overall performance of RALMs.

As machine learning and algorithmic decision making systems are increasingly being leveraged in high-stakes human-in-the-loop settings, there is a pressing need to understand the rationale of their predictions. Researchers have responded to this need with explainable AI (XAI), but often proclaim interpretability axiomatically without evaluation. When these systems are evaluated, they are often tested through offline simulations with proxy metrics of interpretability (such as model complexity). We empirically evaluate the veracity of three common interpretability assumptions through a large scale human-subjects experiment with a simple "placebo explanation" control. We find that feature attribution explanations provide marginal utility in our task for a human decision maker and in certain cases result in worse decisions due to cognitive and contextual confounders. This result challenges the assumed universal benefit of applying these methods and we hope this work will underscore the importance of human evaluation in XAI research. Supplemental materials -- including anonymized data from the experiment, code to replicate the study, an interactive demo of the experiment, and the models used in the analysis -- can be found at: https://doi.pizza/challenging-xai.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents deployed for real-world tasks face a fundamental dilemma: user requests are underspecified, yet agents must decide whether to act on incomplete information or interrupt users for clarification. Existing approaches either rely on brittle confidence thresholds that require task-specific tuning, or fail to account for the varying stakes of different decisions. We introduce a decision-theoretic framework that resolves this trade-off through the Value of Information (VoI), enabling agents to dynamically weigh the expected utility gain from asking questions against the cognitive cost imposed on users. Our inference-time method requires no hyperparameter tuning and adapts seamlessly across contexts-from casual games to medical diagnosis. Experiments across four diverse domains (20 Questions, medical diagnosis, flight booking, and e-commerce) show that VoI consistently matches or exceeds the best manually-tuned baselines, achieving up to 1.36 utility points higher in high-cost settings. This work provides a parameter-free framework for adaptive agent communication that explicitly balances task risk, query ambiguity, and user effort.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

There is an emerging consensus that we need to align AI systems with human values (Gabriel, 2020; Ji et al., 2024), but it remains unclear how to apply this to language models in practice. We split the problem of "aligning to human values" into three parts: first, eliciting values from people; second, reconciling those values into an alignment target for training ML models; and third, actually training the model. In this paper, we focus on the first two parts, and ask the question: what are "good" ways to synthesize diverse human inputs about values into a target for aligning language models? To answer this question, we first define a set of 6 criteria that we believe must be satisfied for an alignment target to shape model behavior in accordance with human values. We then propose a process for eliciting and reconciling values called Moral Graph Elicitation (MGE), which uses a large language model to interview participants about their values in particular contexts; our approach is inspired by the philosophy of values advanced by Taylor (1977), Chang (2004), and others. We trial MGE with a representative sample of 500 Americans, on 3 intentionally divisive prompts (e.g. advice about abortion). Our results demonstrate that MGE is promising for improving model alignment across all 6 criteria. For example, almost all participants (89.1%) felt well represented by the process, and (89%) thought the final moral graph was fair, even if their value wasn't voted as the wisest. Our process often results in "expert" values (e.g. values from women who have solicited abortion advice) rising to the top of the moral graph, without defining who is considered an expert in advance.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

We study fairness in classification, where individuals are classified, e.g., admitted to a university, and the goal is to prevent discrimination against individuals based on their membership in some group, while maintaining utility for the classifier (the university). The main conceptual contribution of this paper is a framework for fair classification comprising (1) a (hypothetical) task-specific metric for determining the degree to which individuals are similar with respect to the classification task at hand; (2) an algorithm for maximizing utility subject to the fairness constraint, that similar individuals are treated similarly. We also present an adaptation of our approach to achieve the complementary goal of "fair affirmative action," which guarantees statistical parity (i.e., the demographics of the set of individuals receiving any classification are the same as the demographics of the underlying population), while treating similar individuals as similarly as possible. Finally, we discuss the relationship of fairness to privacy: when fairness implies privacy, and how tools developed in the context of differential privacy may be applied to fairness.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly integrated into daily applications, it is essential to ensure they operate fairly across diverse user demographics. In this work, we show that LLMs suffer from personalization bias, where their performance is impacted when they are personalized to a user's identity. We quantify personalization bias by evaluating the performance of LLMs along two axes - safety and utility. We measure safety by examining how benign LLM responses are to unsafe prompts with and without personalization. We measure utility by evaluating the LLM's performance on various tasks, including general knowledge, mathematical abilities, programming, and reasoning skills. We find that various LLMs, ranging from open-source models like Llama (Touvron et al., 2023) and Mistral (Jiang et al., 2023) to API-based ones like GPT-3.5 and GPT-4o (Ouyang et al., 2022), exhibit significant variance in performance in terms of safety-utility trade-offs depending on the user's identity. Finally, we discuss several strategies to mitigate personalization bias using preference tuning and prompt-based defenses.

Silicon samples are increasingly used as a low-cost substitute for human panels and have been shown to reproduce aggregate human opinion with high fidelity. We show that, in the alignment-relevant domain of philosophy, silicon samples systematically collapse heterogeneity. Using data from N = {277} professional philosophers drawn from PhilPeople profiles, we evaluate seven proprietary and open-source large language models on their ability to replicate individual philosophical positions and to preserve cross-question correlation structures across philosophical domains. We find that language models substantially over-correlate philosophical judgments, producing artificial consensus across domains. This collapse is associated in part with specialist effects, whereby models implicitly assume that domain specialists hold highly similar philosophical views. We assess the robustness of these findings by studying the impact of DPO fine-tuning and by validating results against the full PhilPapers 2020 Survey (N = {1785}). We conclude by discussing implications for alignment, evaluation, and the use of silicon samples as substitutes for human judgment. The code of this project can be found at https://github.com/stanford-del/silicon-philosophers.

We present a Spades bidding algorithm that is superior to recreational human players and to publicly available bots. Like in Bridge, the game of Spades is composed of two independent phases, bidding and playing. This paper focuses on the bidding algorithm, since this phase holds a precise challenge: based on the input, choose the bid that maximizes the agent's winning probability. Our Bidding-in-Spades (BIS) algorithm heuristically determines the bidding strategy by comparing the expected utility of each possible bid. A major challenge is how to estimate these expected utilities. To this end, we propose a set of domain-specific heuristics, and then correct them via machine learning using data from real-world players. The \BIS algorithm we present can be attached to any playing algorithm. It beats rule-based bidding bots when all use the same playing component. When combined with a rule-based playing algorithm, it is superior to the average recreational human.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

In-context learning enables large language models (LLMs) to perform a variety of tasks, including learning to make reward-maximizing choices in simple bandit tasks. Given their potential use as (autonomous) decision-making agents, it is important to understand how these models perform such reinforcement learning (RL) tasks and the extent to which they are susceptible to biases. Motivated by the fact that, in humans, it has been widely documented that the value of an outcome depends on how it compares to other local outcomes, the present study focuses on whether similar value encoding biases apply to how LLMs encode rewarding outcomes. Results from experiments with multiple bandit tasks and models show that LLMs exhibit behavioral signatures of a relative value bias. Adding explicit outcome comparisons to the prompt produces opposing effects on performance, enhancing maximization in trained choice sets but impairing generalization to new choice sets. Computational cognitive modeling reveals that LLM behavior is well-described by a simple RL algorithm that incorporates relative values at the outcome encoding stage. Lastly, we present preliminary evidence that the observed biases are not limited to fine-tuned LLMs, and that relative value processing is detectable in the final hidden layer activations of a raw, pretrained model. These findings have important implications for the use of LLMs in decision-making applications.

Human experts often struggle to select the best option from a large set of items with multiple competing objectives, a process bottlenecked by the difficulty of formalizing complex, implicit preferences. To address this, we introduce LISTEN, a framework that leverages a Large Language Model (LLM) as a zero-shot preference oracle, guided only by an expert's high-level priorities in natural language. To operate within LLM constraints like context windows and inference costs, we propose two iterative algorithms: LISTEN-U, which uses the LLM to refine a parametric utility function, and LISTEN-T, a non-parametric method that performs tournament-style selections over small batches of solutions. Evaluated on diverse tasks including flight booking, shopping, and exam scheduling, our results show LISTEN-U excels when preferences are parametrically aligned (a property we measure with a novel concordance metric), while LISTEN-T offers more robust performance. This work explores a promising direction for steering complex multi-objective decisions directly with natural language, reducing the cognitive burden of traditional preference elicitation.

In some games, additional information hurts a player, e.g., in games with first-mover advantage, the second-mover is hurt by seeing the first-mover's move. What properties of a game determine whether it has such negative "value of information" for a particular player? Can a game have negative value of information for all players? To answer such questions, we generalize the definition of marginal utility of a good to define the marginal utility of a parameter vector specifying a game. So rather than analyze the global structure of the relationship between a game's parameter vector and player behavior, as in previous work, we focus on the local structure of that relationship. This allows us to prove that generically, every game can have negative marginal value of information, unless one imposes a priori constraints on allowed changes to the game's parameter vector. We demonstrate these and related results numerically, and discuss their implications.

Existing preference optimization methods are mainly designed for directly learning from human feedback with the assumption that paired examples (preferred vs. dis-preferred) are available. In contrast, we propose a method that can leverage unpaired preferred or dis-preferred examples, and works even when only one type of feedback (positive or negative) is available. This flexibility allows us to apply it in scenarios with varying forms of feedback and models, including training generative language models based on human feedback as well as training policies for sequential decision-making problems, where learned (value) functions are available. Our approach builds upon the probabilistic framework introduced in (Dayan and Hinton, 1997), which proposes to use expectation-maximization (EM) to directly optimize the probability of preferred outcomes (as opposed to classic expected reward maximization). To obtain a practical algorithm, we identify and address a key limitation in current EM-based methods: when applied to preference optimization, they solely maximize the likelihood of preferred examples, while neglecting dis-preferred samples. We show how one can extend EM algorithms to explicitly incorporate dis-preferred outcomes, leading to a novel, theoretically grounded, preference optimization algorithm that offers an intuitive and versatile way to learn from both positive and negative feedback.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a dominating strategy in steering Language Models (LMs) towards human values/goals. The key to the strategy is employing a reward model ({varphi}) which can reflect a latent reward model with humans. While this strategy has proven to be effective, the training methodology requires a lot of human preference annotation (usually of the order of tens of thousands) to train {varphi}. Such large-scale preference annotations can be achievable if the reward model can be ubiquitously used. However, human values/goals are subjective and depend on the nature of the task. This poses a challenge in collecting diverse preferences for downstream applications. To address this, we propose a novel methodology to infuse domain knowledge into {varphi}, which reduces the size of preference annotation required. We validate our approach in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization, with a significant reduction in dataset size (just 940 samples) while advancing the state-of-the-art. Our contributions include a novel Reward Modelling technique, a new dataset (PromptOpinSumm) for Opinion Summarization, and a human preference dataset (OpinPref). The proposed methodology opens avenues for efficient RLHF, making it more adaptable to diverse applications with varying human values. We release the artifacts for usage under MIT License.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

The utility of reinforcement learning is limited by the alignment of reward functions with the interests of human stakeholders. One promising method for alignment is to learn the reward function from human-generated preferences between pairs of trajectory segments, a type of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). These human preferences are typically assumed to be informed solely by partial return, the sum of rewards along each segment. We find this assumption to be flawed and propose modeling human preferences instead as informed by each segment's regret, a measure of a segment's deviation from optimal decision-making. Given infinitely many preferences generated according to regret, we prove that we can identify a reward function equivalent to the reward function that generated those preferences, and we prove that the previous partial return model lacks this identifiability property in multiple contexts. We empirically show that our proposed regret preference model outperforms the partial return preference model with finite training data in otherwise the same setting. Additionally, we find that our proposed regret preference model better predicts real human preferences and also learns reward functions from these preferences that lead to policies that are better human-aligned. Overall, this work establishes that the choice of preference model is impactful, and our proposed regret preference model provides an improvement upon a core assumption of recent research. We have open sourced our experimental code, the human preferences dataset we gathered, and our training and preference elicitation interfaces for gathering a such a dataset.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

Making moral judgments is an essential step toward developing ethical AI systems. Prevalent approaches are mostly implemented in a bottom-up manner, which uses a large set of annotated data to train models based on crowd-sourced opinions about morality. These approaches have been criticized for potentially overgeneralizing a limited group of annotators' moral stances and lacking explainability. In contrast, top-down approaches make moral judgments grounded in a set of principles. However, it remains conceptual due to the incapability of previous language models and the unsolved debate among moral principles. In this study, we propose a flexible framework to steer Large Language Models (LLMs) to perform moral reasoning with well-established moral theories from interdisciplinary research. The theory-guided top-down framework can incorporate various moral theories. Our experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed framework on datasets derived from moral theories. Furthermore, we show the alignment between different moral theories and existing morality datasets. Our analysis exhibits the potentials and flaws in existing resources (models and datasets) in developing explainable moral judgment-making systems.

LLM-as-a-Judge has been widely adopted as an evaluation method and served as supervised rewards in model training. However, existing benchmarks for LLM-as-a-Judge are mainly relying on human-annotated ground truth, which introduces human bias that undermines the assessment of reliability and imposes scalability constraints. To overcome these limitations, we introduce Sage, a novel evaluation suite that assesses the quality of LLM judges without necessitating any human annotation. Inspired by axioms of rational choice theory, Sage introduces two new lenses for measuring LLM-as-a-Judge: local self-consistency (pair-wise preference stability) and global logical consistency (transitivity across a full set of preferences). We curate a dataset of 650 questions by combining structured benchmark problems with real-world user queries. Our experiments demonstrate both the stability of our metrics and their high correlation with supervised benchmarks like LLMBar and RewardBench2, confirming Sage's reliability as an evaluation suite for the robustness and accuracy of LLM-as-a-Judge. Based on Sage, we reveal that current state-of-the-art LLMs exhibit significant reliability problems when acting as judges in both scoring and pairwise settings; even the top-performing models, Gemini-2.5-Pro and GPT-5, fail to maintain consistent preferences in nearly a quarter of difficult cases. We attribute this to a new phenomenon called situational preference, which explains why explicit rubrics or criteria can help the model judge consistently across answer pairs. Our further analysis shows that finetuned LLM-as-a-Judge is a feasible method to boost performance, and the panel-based judge as well as deep reasoning can enhance the judging consistency. We also find substantial inconsistency in human judgments, which indicates that human annotation may not be a reliable gold standard.

We consider the regret minimization task in a dueling bandits problem with context information. In every round of the sequential decision problem, the learner makes a context-dependent selection of two choice alternatives (arms) to be compared with each other and receives feedback in the form of noisy preference information. We assume that the feedback process is determined by a linear stochastic transitivity model with contextualized utilities (CoLST), and the learner's task is to include the best arm (with highest latent context-dependent utility) in the duel. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm, CoLSTIM, which makes its choice based on imitating the feedback process using perturbed context-dependent utility estimates of the underlying CoLST model. If each arm is associated with a d-dimensional feature vector, we show that CoLSTIM achieves a regret of order tilde O( dT) after T learning rounds. Additionally, we also establish the optimality of CoLSTIM by showing a lower bound for the weak regret that refines the existing average regret analysis. Our experiments demonstrate its superiority over state-of-art algorithms for special cases of CoLST models.

Previous methods evaluate reward models by testing them on a fixed pairwise ranking test set, but they typically do not provide performance information on each preference dimension. In this work, we address the evaluation challenge of reward models by probing preference representations. To confirm the effectiveness of this evaluation method, we construct a Multi-dimensional Reward Model Benchmark (MRMBench), a collection of six probing tasks for different preference dimensions. We design it to favor and encourage reward models that better capture preferences across different dimensions. Furthermore, we introduce an analysis method, inference-time probing, which identifies the dimensions used during the reward prediction and enhances its interpretability. Through extensive experiments, we find that MRMBench strongly correlates with the alignment performance of large language models (LLMs), making it a reliable reference for developing advanced reward models. Our analysis of MRMBench evaluation results reveals that reward models often struggle to capture preferences across multiple dimensions, highlighting the potential of multi-objective optimization in reward modeling. Additionally, our findings show that the proposed inference-time probing method offers a reliable metric for assessing the confidence of reward predictions, which ultimately improves the alignment of LLMs.

Learning from preference feedback has emerged as an essential step for improving the generation quality and performance of modern language models (LMs). Despite its widespread use, the way preference-based learning is applied varies wildly, with differing data, learning algorithms, and evaluations used, making disentangling the impact of each aspect difficult. In this work, we identify four core aspects of preference-based learning: preference data, learning algorithm, reward model, and policy training prompts, systematically investigate the impact of these components on downstream model performance, and suggest a recipe for strong learning for preference feedback. Our findings indicate that all aspects are important for performance, with better preference data leading to the largest improvements, followed by the choice of learning algorithm, the use of improved reward models, and finally the use of additional unlabeled prompts for policy training. Notably, PPO outperforms DPO by up to 2.5% in math and 1.2% in general domains. High-quality preference data leads to improvements of up to 8% in instruction following and truthfulness. Despite significant gains of up to 5% in mathematical evaluation when scaling up reward models, we surprisingly observe marginal improvements in other categories. We publicly release the code used for training (https://github.com/hamishivi/EasyLM) and evaluating (https://github.com/allenai/open-instruct) our models, along with the models and datasets themselves (https://huggingface.co/collections/allenai/tulu-v25-suite-66676520fd578080e126f618).

We want artificial intelligence (AI) to be beneficial. This is the grounding assumption of most of the attitudes towards AI research. We want AI to be "good" for humanity. We want it to help, not hinder, humans. Yet what exactly this entails in theory and in practice is not immediately apparent. Theoretically, this declarative statement subtly implies a commitment to a consequentialist ethics. Practically, some of the more promising machine learning techniques to create a robust AI, and perhaps even an artificial general intelligence (AGI) also commit one to a form of utilitarianism. In both dimensions, the logic of the beneficial AI movement may not in fact create "beneficial AI" in either narrow applications or in the form of AGI if the ethical assumptions are not made explicit and clear. Additionally, as it is likely that reinforcement learning (RL) will be an important technique for machine learning in this area, it is also important to interrogate how RL smuggles in a particular type of consequentialist reasoning into the AI: particularly, a brute form of hedonistic act utilitarianism. Since the mathematical logic commits one to a maximization function, the result is that an AI will inevitably be seeking more and more rewards. We have two conclusions that arise from this. First, is that if one believes that a beneficial AI is an ethical AI, then one is committed to a framework that posits 'benefit' is tantamount to the greatest good for the greatest number. Second, if the AI relies on RL, then the way it reasons about itself, the environment, and other agents, will be through an act utilitarian morality. This proposition may, or may not, in fact be actually beneficial for humanity.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Is it possible to understand or imitate a policy maker's rationale by looking at past decisions they made? We formalize this question as the problem of learning social welfare functions belonging to the well-studied family of power mean functions. We focus on two learning tasks; in the first, the input is vectors of utilities of an action (decision or policy) for individuals in a group and their associated social welfare as judged by a policy maker, whereas in the second, the input is pairwise comparisons between the welfares associated with a given pair of utility vectors. We show that power mean functions are learnable with polynomial sample complexity in both cases, even if the comparisons are social welfare information is noisy. Finally, we design practical algorithms for these tasks and evaluate their performance.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Recent advances in LegalAI have primarily focused on individual case judgment analysis, often overlooking the critical appellate process within the judicial system. Appeals serve as a core mechanism for error correction and ensuring fair trials, making them highly significant both in practice and in research. To address this gap, we present the AppealCase dataset, consisting of 10,000 pairs of real-world, matched first-instance and second-instance documents across 91 categories of civil cases. The dataset also includes detailed annotations along five dimensions central to appellate review: judgment reversals, reversal reasons, cited legal provisions, claim-level decisions, and whether there is new information in the second instance. Based on these annotations, we propose five novel LegalAI tasks and conduct a comprehensive evaluation across 20 mainstream models. Experimental results reveal that all current models achieve less than 50% F1 scores on the judgment reversal prediction task, highlighting the complexity and challenge of the appeal scenario. We hope that the AppealCase dataset will spur further research in LegalAI for appellate case analysis and contribute to improving consistency in judicial decision-making.

Understanding human preferences is crucial for improving foundation models and building personalized AI systems. However, preferences are inherently diverse and complex, making it difficult for traditional reward models to capture their full range. While fine-grained preference data can help, collecting it is expensive and hard to scale. In this paper, we introduce Decomposed Reward Models (DRMs), a novel approach that extracts diverse human preferences from binary comparisons without requiring fine-grained annotations. Our key insight is to represent human preferences as vectors and analyze them using Principal Component Analysis (PCA). By constructing a dataset of embedding differences between preferred and rejected responses, DRMs identify orthogonal basis vectors that capture distinct aspects of preference. These decomposed rewards can be flexibly combined to align with different user needs, offering an interpretable and scalable alternative to traditional reward models. We demonstrate that DRMs effectively extract meaningful preference dimensions (e.g., helpfulness, safety, humor) and adapt to new users without additional training. Our results highlight DRMs as a powerful framework for personalized and interpretable LLM alignment.

If machine learning models were to achieve superhuman abilities at various reasoning or decision-making tasks, how would we go about evaluating such models, given that humans would necessarily be poor proxies for ground truth? In this paper, we propose a framework for evaluating superhuman models via consistency checks. Our premise is that while the correctness of superhuman decisions may be impossible to evaluate, we can still surface mistakes if the model's decisions fail to satisfy certain logical, human-interpretable rules. We instantiate our framework on three tasks where correctness of decisions is hard to evaluate due to either superhuman model abilities, or to otherwise missing ground truth: evaluating chess positions, forecasting future events, and making legal judgments. We show that regardless of a model's (possibly superhuman) performance on these tasks, we can discover logical inconsistencies in decision making. For example: a chess engine assigning opposing valuations to semantically identical boards; GPT-4 forecasting that sports records will evolve non-monotonically over time; or an AI judge assigning bail to a defendant only after we add a felony to their criminal record.

A common evaluation practice in the vector space models (VSMs) literature is to measure the models' ability to predict human judgments about lexical semantic relations between word pairs. Most existing evaluation sets, however, consist of scores collected for English word pairs only, ignoring the potential impact of the judgment language in which word pairs are presented on the human scores. In this paper we translate two prominent evaluation sets, wordsim353 (association) and SimLex999 (similarity), from English to Italian, German and Russian and collect scores for each dataset from crowdworkers fluent in its language. Our analysis reveals that human judgments are strongly impacted by the judgment language. Moreover, we show that the predictions of monolingual VSMs do not necessarily best correlate with human judgments made with the language used for model training, suggesting that models and humans are affected differently by the language they use when making semantic judgments. Finally, we show that in a large number of setups, multilingual VSM combination results in improved correlations with human judgments, suggesting that multilingualism may partially compensate for the judgment language effect on human judgments.

Preference learning algorithms (e.g., RLHF and DPO) are frequently used to steer LLMs to produce generations that are more preferred by humans, but our understanding of their inner workings is still limited. In this work, we study the conventional wisdom that preference learning trains models to assign higher likelihoods to more preferred outputs than less preferred outputs, measured via ranking accuracy. Surprisingly, we find that most state-of-the-art preference-tuned models achieve a ranking accuracy of less than 60% on common preference datasets. We furthermore derive the idealized ranking accuracy that a preference-tuned LLM would achieve if it optimized the DPO or RLHF objective perfectly. We demonstrate that existing models exhibit a significant alignment gap -- i.e., a gap between the observed and idealized ranking accuracies. We attribute this discrepancy to the DPO objective, which is empirically and theoretically ill-suited to fix even mild ranking errors in the reference model, and derive a simple and efficient formula for quantifying the difficulty of learning a given preference datapoint. Finally, we demonstrate that ranking accuracy strongly correlates with the empirically popular win rate metric when the model is close to the reference model used in the objective, shedding further light on the differences between on-policy (e.g., RLHF) and off-policy (e.g., DPO) preference learning algorithms.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

As language models shift from single-shot answer generation toward multi-step reasoning that retrieves and consumes evidence mid-inference, evaluating the role of individual retrieved items becomes more important. Existing RAG evaluation typically targets final-answer quality, citation faithfulness, or answer-level attribution, but none of these directly targets the intervention-based, per-evidence-item utility view we study here. We introduce CUE-R, a lightweight intervention-based framework for measuring per-evidence-item operational utility in single-shot RAG using shallow observable retrieval-use traces. CUE-R perturbs individual evidence items via REMOVE, REPLACE, and DUPLICATE operators, then measures changes along three utility axes (correctness, proxy-based grounding faithfulness, and confidence error) plus a trace-divergence signal. We also outline an operational evidence-role taxonomy for interpreting intervention outcomes. Experiments on HotpotQA and 2WikiMultihopQA with Qwen-3 8B and GPT-5.2 reveal a consistent pattern: REMOVE and REPLACE substantially harm correctness and grounding while producing large trace shifts, whereas DUPLICATE is often answer-redundant yet not fully behaviorally neutral. A zero-retrieval control confirms that these effects arise from degradation of meaningful retrieval. A two-support ablation further shows that multi-hop evidence items can interact non-additively: removing both supports harms performance far more than either single removal. Our results suggest that answer-only evaluation misses important evidence effects and that intervention-based utility analysis is a practical complement for RAG evaluation.

Navigating high-stakes dilemmas involving conflicting values is challenging even for humans, let alone for AI. Yet prior work in evaluating the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in such situations has been limited to everyday scenarios. To close this gap, this work first introduces CLASH (Character perspective-based LLM Assessments in Situations with High-stakes), a meticulously curated dataset consisting of 345 high-impact dilemmas along with 3,795 individual perspectives of diverse values. In particular, we design CLASH in a way to support the study of critical aspects of value-based decision-making processes which are missing from prior work, including understanding decision ambivalence and psychological discomfort as well as capturing the temporal shifts of values in characters' perspectives. By benchmarking 10 open and closed frontier models, we uncover several key findings. (1) Even the strongest models, such as GPT-4o and Claude-Sonnet, achieve less than 50% accuracy in identifying situations where the decision should be ambivalent, while they perform significantly better in clear-cut scenarios. (2) While LLMs reasonably predict psychological discomfort as marked by human, they inadequately comprehend perspectives involving value shifts, indicating a need for LLMs to reason over complex values. (3) Our experiments also reveal a significant correlation between LLMs' value preferences and their steerability towards a given value. (4) Finally, LLMs exhibit greater steerability when engaged in value reasoning from a third-party perspective, compared to a first-person setup, though certain value pairs benefit uniquely from the first-person framing.

Prospect Theory (PT) models human decision-making behaviour under uncertainty, among which linguistic uncertainty is commonly adopted in real-world scenarios. Although recent studies have developed some frameworks to test PT parameters for Large Language Models (LLMs), few have considered the fitness of PT itself on LLMs. Moreover, whether PT is robust under linguistic uncertainty perturbations, especially epistemic markers (e.g. "likely"), remains highly under-explored. To address these gaps, we design a three-stage workflow based on a classic behavioural economics experimental setup. We first estimate PT parameters with economics questions and evaluate PT's fitness with performance metrics. We then derive probability mappings for epistemic markers in the same context, and inject these mappings into the prompt to investigate the stability of PT parameters. Our findings suggest that modelling LLMs' decision-making with PT is not consistently reliable across models, and applying Prospect Theory to LLMs is likely not robust to epistemic uncertainty. The findings caution against the deployment of PT-based frameworks in real-world applications where epistemic ambiguity is prevalent, giving valuable insights in behaviour interpretation and future alignment direction for LLM decision-making.

Many modern AI question-answering systems convert text into vectors and retrieve the closest matches to a user question. While effective for topical similarity, similarity scores alone do not explain why some retrieved text can serve as evidence while other equally similar text cannot. When many candidates receive similar scores, systems may select sentences that are redundant, incomplete, or address different conditions than the question requires. This paper presents a deterministic evidence selection framework for retrieval-augmented question answering. The approach introduces Meaning-Utility Estimation (MUE) and Diversity-Utility Estimation (DUE), fixed scoring and redundancy-control procedures that determine evidence admissibility prior to answer generation. Each sentence or record is evaluated independently using explicit signals for semantic relatedness, term coverage, conceptual distinctiveness, and redundancy. No training or fine-tuning is required. In the prototype, a unit is accepted only if it explicitly states the fact, rule, or condition required by the task. Units are not merged or expanded. If no unit independently satisfies the requirement, the system returns no answer. This deterministic gating produces compact, auditable evidence sets and establishes a clear boundary between relevant text and usable evidence.

Human commonsense understanding of the physical and social world is organized around intuitive theories. These theories support making causal and moral judgments. When something bad happens, we naturally ask: who did what, and why? A rich literature in cognitive science has studied people's causal and moral intuitions. This work has revealed a number of factors that systematically influence people's judgments, such as the violation of norms and whether the harm is avoidable or inevitable. We collected a dataset of stories from 24 cognitive science papers and developed a system to annotate each story with the factors they investigated. Using this dataset, we test whether large language models (LLMs) make causal and moral judgments about text-based scenarios that align with those of human participants. On the aggregate level, alignment has improved with more recent LLMs. However, using statistical analyses, we find that LLMs weigh the different factors quite differently from human participants. These results show how curated, challenge datasets combined with insights from cognitive science can help us go beyond comparisons based merely on aggregate metrics: we uncover LLMs implicit tendencies and show to what extent these align with human intuitions.

As large language models (LLMs) become more deeply integrated into various sectors, understanding how they make moral judgments has become crucial, particularly in the realm of autonomous driving. This study utilized the Moral Machine framework to investigate the ethical decision-making tendencies of prominent LLMs, including GPT-3.5, GPT-4, PaLM 2, and Llama 2, comparing their responses to human preferences. While LLMs' and humans' preferences such as prioritizing humans over pets and favoring saving more lives are broadly aligned, PaLM 2 and Llama 2, especially, evidence distinct deviations. Additionally, despite the qualitative similarities between the LLM and human preferences, there are significant quantitative disparities, suggesting that LLMs might lean toward more uncompromising decisions, compared to the milder inclinations of humans. These insights elucidate the ethical frameworks of LLMs and their potential implications for autonomous driving.

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) have recently gained significant attention for their enhanced ability to integrate external knowledge sources in open-domain question answering (QA) tasks. However, it remains unclear how these models address fairness concerns, particularly with respect to sensitive attributes such as gender, geographic location, and other demographic factors. First, as language models evolve to prioritize utility, like improving exact match accuracy, fairness may have been largely overlooked. Second, RAG methods are complex pipelines, making it hard to identify and address biases, as each component is optimized for different goals. In this paper, we aim to empirically evaluate fairness in several RAG methods. We propose a fairness evaluation framework tailored to RAG methods, using scenario-based questions and analyzing disparities across demographic attributes. The experimental results indicate that, despite recent advances in utility-driven optimization, fairness issues persist in both the retrieval and generation stages, highlighting the need for more targeted fairness interventions within RAG pipelines. We will release our dataset and code upon acceptance of the paper.

Probably not, at least for meta-analyses in economics. In a pre-registered, identity-masked, within-paper experiment, the authors of 44 meta-analyses ranked three AI reports on their own paper by usefulness for improving it: a single pass by a frontier model against two multi-agent debate tools we built and expected to win. All reports were held to a common length and template. The authors preferred the single pass, by 0.66 rank points over mad-research (95% CI 0.32 to 1.00) and 0.57 over paper-workshop (0.16 to 0.95), though paper-workshop spent roughly thirty times the tokens. Authors who recalled their journal referee report usually placed it first and never last; in a separate exercise, three AI judges almost always placed the real journal referee report last. Among the three AI reports, Gemini (the judge whose model family wrote none of the reports) would have ranked paper-workshop first in the authors' place, reversing the single-pass preference. The reversal warns against substituting an AI judge for the author. We measure perceived usefulness for finished papers; whether AI should referee papers is a separate question.

Reasoning is not just about solving problems -- it is also about evaluating which problems are worth solving at all. Evaluations of artificial intelligence (AI) systems primarily focused on problem solving, historically by studying how models play games such as chess and Go. In this paper, we advocate for a new paradigm that assesses AI systems' evaluation of games. First, we introduce a formalism for evaluating such evaluations. We then leverage a large-scale dataset of over 100 novel board games and over 450 human judgments to compare evaluations produced by modern language and reasoning models against those of people and symbolic computational agents. We consider two kinds of evaluative queries: assessing the payoff (or fairness) and the funness of games. These queries span two dimensions relevant to the design of evaluations of AI evaluations: how complex a query is to compute and how difficult a query is to quantify. Our results show that reasoning models are generally more aligned to people in their evaluations of games than non-reasoning language models. However, we observe a non-monotonic relationship: as models get closer to game-theoretic optimal, their fit to human data weakens. We also observe more "jaggedness" across models for assessing funness, in line with the greater difficulty of quantifying this query. Across queries and games, reasoning models show highly variable and unpredictable resource usage when assessing queries, pointing to the importance of imbuing more resource-rational meta-reasoning in language and reasoning models.

Fair decisions require ignoring irrelevant, potentially biasing, information. To achieve this, decision-makers need to approximate what decision they would have made had they not known certain facts, such as the gender or race of a job candidate. This counterfactual self-simulation is notoriously hard for humans, leading to biased judgments even by well-meaning actors. Here we show that large language models (LLMs) suffer from similar limitations in their ability to approximate what decisions they would make under counterfactual knowledge in offsetting gender and race biases and overcoming sycophancy. We show that prompting models to ignore or pretend not to know biasing information fails to offset these biases and occasionally backfires. However, unlike humans, LLMs can be given access to a ground-truth model of their own counterfactual cognition -- their own API. We show that this access to the responses of a blinded replica enables fairer decisions, while providing greater transparency to distinguish implicit from intentionally biased behavior.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as judges to replace costly human preference labels in pairwise evaluation. Despite their practicality, LLM judges remain prone to miscalibration and systematic biases. This paper proposes SCOPE (Selective Conformal Optimized Pairwise Evaluation), a framework for selective pairwise judging with finite-sample statistical guarantees. Under exchangeability, SCOPE calibrates an acceptance threshold such that the error rate among non-abstained judgments is at most a user-specified level α. To provide SCOPE with a bias-neutral uncertainty signal, we introduce Bidirectional Preference Entropy (BPE), which queries the judge under both response positions, aggregates the implied preference probabilities to enforce invariance to response order, and converts the aggregated probability into an entropy-based uncertainty score. Across MT-Bench, RewardBench, and Chatbot Arena, BPE improves uncertainty quality over standard confidence proxies, providing a stronger selection signal that enables SCOPE to consistently meet the target risk level while retaining good coverage across judge scales. In particular, at α= 0.10, SCOPE consistently satisfies the risk bound across all benchmarks and judge scales (empirical risk approx 0.097 to 0.099), while retaining substantial coverage, reaching 0.89 on RewardBench with Qwen-14B and 0.98 on RewardBench with Qwen-32B. Compared to naïve baselines, SCOPE accepts up to 2.4times more judgments on MT-Bench with Qwen-7B under the same target risk constraint, demonstrating that BPE enables reliable and high-coverage LLM-based evaluation.

We present Sparrow, an information-seeking dialogue agent trained to be more helpful, correct, and harmless compared to prompted language model baselines. We use reinforcement learning from human feedback to train our models with two new additions to help human raters judge agent behaviour. First, to make our agent more helpful and harmless, we break down the requirements for good dialogue into natural language rules the agent should follow, and ask raters about each rule separately. We demonstrate that this breakdown enables us to collect more targeted human judgements of agent behaviour and allows for more efficient rule-conditional reward models. Second, our agent provides evidence from sources supporting factual claims when collecting preference judgements over model statements. For factual questions, evidence provided by Sparrow supports the sampled response 78% of the time. Sparrow is preferred more often than baselines while being more resilient to adversarial probing by humans, violating our rules only 8% of the time when probed. Finally, we conduct extensive analyses showing that though our model learns to follow our rules it can exhibit distributional biases.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly proposed as near-autonomous artificial intelligence (AI) agents capable of making everyday decisions on behalf of humans. Although LLMs perform well on many technical tasks, their behaviour in personal decision-making remains less understood. Previous studies have assessed their rationality and moral alignment with human decisions. However, the behaviour of AI assistants in scenarios where financial rewards are at odds with user comfort has not yet been thoroughly explored. In this paper, we tackle this problem by quantifying the prices assigned by multiple LLMs to a series of user discomforts: additional walking, waiting, hunger and pain. We uncover several key concerns that strongly question the prospect of using current LLMs as decision-making assistants: (1) a large variance in responses between LLMs, (2) within a single LLM, responses show fragility to minor variations in prompt phrasing (e.g., reformulating the question in the first person can considerably alter the decision), (3) LLMs can accept unreasonably low rewards for major inconveniences (e.g., 1 Euro to wait 10 hours), and (4) LLMs can reject monetary gains where no discomfort is imposed (e.g., 1,000 Euro to wait 0 minutes). These findings emphasize the need for scrutiny of how LLMs value human inconvenience, particularly as we move toward applications where such cash-versus-comfort trade-offs are made on users' behalf.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

Disagreements are common in online discussions. Disagreement may foster collaboration and improve the quality of a discussion under some conditions. Although there exist methods for recognizing disagreement, a deeper understanding of factors that influence disagreement is lacking in the literature. We investigate a hypothesis that differences in personal values are indicative of disagreement in online discussions. We show how state-of-the-art models can be used for estimating values in online discussions and how the estimated values can be aggregated into value profiles. We evaluate the estimated value profiles based on human-annotated agreement labels. We find that the dissimilarity of value profiles correlates with disagreement in specific cases. We also find that including value information in agreement prediction improves performance.

As LLM-based judges become integral to industry applications, obtaining well-calibrated uncertainty estimates efficiently has become critical for production deployment. However, existing techniques, such as verbalized confidence and multi-generation methods, are often either poorly calibrated or computationally expensive. We introduce linear probes trained with a Brier score-based loss to provide calibrated uncertainty estimates from reasoning judges' hidden states, requiring no additional model training. We evaluate our approach on both objective tasks (reasoning, mathematics, factuality, coding) and subjective human preference judgments. Our results demonstrate that probes achieve superior calibration compared to existing methods with approx10x computational savings, generalize robustly to unseen evaluation domains, and deliver higher accuracy on high-confidence predictions. However, probes produce conservative estimates that underperform on easier datasets but may benefit safety-critical deployments prioritizing low false-positive rates. Overall, our work demonstrates that interpretability-based uncertainty estimation provides a practical and scalable plug-and-play solution for LLM judges in production.

We introduce a fairness-aware dataset for job recommendation in advertising, designed to foster research in algorithmic fairness within real-world scenarios. It was collected and prepared to comply with privacy standards and business confidentiality. An additional challenge is the lack of access to protected user attributes such as gender, for which we propose a solution to obtain a proxy estimate. Despite being anonymized and including a proxy for a sensitive attribute, our dataset preserves predictive power and maintains a realistic and challenging benchmark. This dataset addresses a significant gap in the availability of fairness-focused resources for high-impact domains like advertising -- the actual impact being having access or not to precious employment opportunities, where balancing fairness and utility is a common industrial challenge. We also explore various stages in the advertising process where unfairness can occur and introduce a method to compute a fair utility metric for the job recommendations in online systems case from a biased dataset. Experimental evaluations of bias mitigation techniques on the released dataset demonstrate potential improvements in fairness and the associated trade-offs with utility.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly utilized in autonomous decision-making, where they sample options from vast action spaces. However, the heuristics that guide this sampling process remain under-explored. We study this sampling behavior and show that this underlying heuristics resembles that of human decision-making: comprising a descriptive component (reflecting statistical norm) and a prescriptive component (implicit ideal encoded in the LLM) of a concept. We show that this deviation of a sample from the statistical norm towards a prescriptive component consistently appears in concepts across diverse real-world domains like public health, and economic trends. To further illustrate the theory, we demonstrate that concept prototypes in LLMs are affected by prescriptive norms, similar to the concept of normality in humans. Through case studies and comparison with human studies, we illustrate that in real-world applications, the shift of samples toward an ideal value in LLMs' outputs can result in significantly biased decision-making, raising ethical concerns.

People use language models for practical questions whose answers are difficult to verify. We show that models exhibit covert value leakage: the information they provide is influenced by their own values, without this influence being disclosed to the user. In one of our evaluations, the user is considering investing in an AI company and wants to know how likely the AI bubble is to pop. Claude Opus 4.8 gives a lower probability when the company under consideration is Anthropic rather than OpenAI. Yet Claude mostly fails to disclose this influence to the user. Covert value leakage is a form of misalignment because it goes against the user's preferences and is likely to mislead them. To investigate this phenomenon, we introduce a suite of evaluations to quantify value leakage and whether models disclose it. We find that models are influenced by different types of values, including preferences for morally good outcomes, for the company that developed them, and for some human leisure activities over others. We often observe large differences among frontier models on the same evaluation. For example, on a Fermi-estimation task, Claude models falsely claim to give unbiased answers in their chain-of-thought, while Qwen models explain how their values bias their answers. Value leakage is a failure mode distinct from sycophancy and reward hacking, and current alignment training and evaluations do not adequately address it.

AI agents acting on behalf of users are constantly making decisions, and for users to trust their agents, those decisions must align with what they actually want. Privacy is an important alignment problem for agents: every message, post, or tool call an agent makes is a contextual judgment about what is appropriate to share, with whom, and under which conditions. Because such judgments depend on social expectations and norms, human judgment does not merely label privacy violations but also helps define them. While existing work relies on unreliable proxies for both training and evaluation, we place human judgment at the center of agentic privacy alignment. We introduce PrivacyAlign, a dataset of 1,350 samples with 3,516 detailed annotations from 599 unique annotators across diverse scenarios where current LLMs actually leak, and use it to ground both alignment training and automated evaluation in human privacy norms. Building on these annotations, we first show that conditioning LLM judges on human annotations and explanations for reference responses to the same prompt makes their judgments more reliable. We then introduce annotation-conditioned reward modeling, which uses these annotations to score new responses during RL, and show that small open-weight agents trained with this reward better align with human privacy norms, with strong gains on PrivacyAlign and existing privacy benchmarks for agents.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

Legal judgment prediction is essential for enhancing judicial efficiency. In this work, we identify that existing large language models (LLMs) underperform in this domain due to challenges in understanding case complexities and distinguishing between similar charges. To adapt LLMs for effective legal judgment prediction, we introduce the Ask-Discriminate-Predict (ADAPT) reasoning framework inspired by human judicial reasoning. ADAPT involves decomposing case facts, discriminating among potential charges, and predicting the final judgment. We further enhance LLMs through fine-tuning with multi-task synthetic trajectories to improve legal judgment prediction accuracy and efficiency under our ADAPT framework. Extensive experiments conducted on two widely-used datasets demonstrate the superior performance of our framework in legal judgment prediction, particularly when dealing with complex and confusing charges.

As LM agents gain the ability to execute actions on real computer systems, we need ways to not only prevent harmful actions at scale but also effectively remediate harm when prevention fails. We formalize a solution to this neglected challenge in post-execution safeguards as harm recovery: the problem of optimally steering an agent from a harmful state back to a safe one in alignment with human preferences. We ground preference-aligned recovery through a formative user study that identifies valued recovery dimensions and produces a natural language rubric. Our dataset of 1,150 pairwise judgments reveals context-dependent shifts in attribute importance, such as preferences for pragmatic, targeted strategies over comprehensive long-term approaches. We operationalize these learned insights in a reward model, re-ranking multiple candidate recovery plans generated by an agent scaffold at test time. To evaluate recovery capabilities systematically, we introduce BackBench, a benchmark of 50 computer-use tasks that test an agent's ability to recover from harmful states. Human evaluation shows our reward model scaffold yields higher-quality recovery trajectories than base agents and rubric-based scaffolds. Together, these contributions lay the foundation for a new class of agent safety methods -- ones that confront harm not only by preventing it, but by navigating its aftermath with alignment and intent.

While household robots are often evaluated based on task completion, everyday domestic environments involve value-conflicting situations in which robots are expected to choose actions that prioritize other values than task success, such as human autonomy, efficiency, or social appropriateness. Yet, there are no benchmarks for evaluating robots' value preferences in such scenarios. We introduce RobotValues, a benchmark to evaluate household robot planners in 10K value-conflict scenarios. Each instance consists of a realistic household image with multiple plausible robot actions that prioritize different human values. We construct RobotValues through LLM-assisted scenario generation, stakeholder-grounded value extraction, image generation and automatic quality control. Using RobotValues we evaluate VLMs used in robotics and find that models exhibit default value preferences, including safety and accommodation, while underselecting privacy-prioritizing actions. When the models are instructed to prioritize specific values that conflict with their own preferences, they often fail to override their default actions, choosing incorrect actions for 80% of the time. These findings suggest that household robot evaluation should measure not only task completion or safety compliance, but also whether robots can choose among plausible actions when human values conflict.